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Introduction 
Sexual violence and conflict go hand in hand. In ancient warfare, sexual violence was a common 
procedure, perceived as an inevitable consequence of war. Soldiers needed to ‘release’ after heavy 
fighting; sexual distraction would reward, motivate and relax them. In other words, sexual 
violence was seen as ‘collateral damage’ and was therefore never prosecuted as a crime. This 
practice started to change after the Second World War. In fact, at the moment the existence of 
sexual violence was internationally acknowledged, women’s rights gained recognition and several 
forms of sexual violence were classified. Finally, sexual violence was labeled as a ‘weapon of 
war’.1 
However, international sexual crimes – just like acts of domestic sexual violence – are difficult to 
prosecute due to shame and stigma, evidence issues, and the large scale on which sexual crimes 
are being committed. To illustrate, numbers of people raped during wartime reach heights of an 
estimated 20,000 in Yugoslavia, over 50,000 in Sierra Leone, and approximately 500,000 in 
Rwanda.2 More recently, the numbers of people raped during the conflict in the Eastern DRC 
have lead to controversy, as a research conducted by the American Journal of Public Health 
claims that in Congo every hour 48 women are raped.3 Rape statistics and the significance of an 
exact number are frequently questioned due to the large number of sexual crimes that remains 
unreported. In any event, the number is probably increasing as you read this. 
In practice, every conflict remains accompanied by sexual violence and no substantive counter 
action has been undertaken as a response to counteract these horrid acts of inhumane behavior. 
Therefore impunity remains a major concern.4 Moreover, the occurrence of sexual violence 
seems to have increased during the aftermath of war. ‘Post-conflict’ does not imply the end of 
violence as most post-war societies suffer from a high number of human rights violations. More 
specifically, massive sexual violence increasingly seems to take place outside conflict zones; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The UN Resolution 1820 on Women and peace and security (2008) describes rape as ‘a tactic of war’. Similar 
terminology has been used frequently in the media. 
2 These data are estimations derived from The Economist, ‘Violence against Women: War’s Overlooked Victims’, 13 
January, 2011. Under the tabel ‘customary evil’. Retrieved from http://www.economist.com/node/17900482 on 21 
November, 2011. See also Human Rights Watch, ‘Shattered lives, sexual violence during the Rwandan Genocide and 
its Aftermath’, September 1996. See www.hrw.org. 
3 Amber Peterman, Tia Palermo and Caryn Bredenkamp, ‘Estimates and Determinants of Sexual Violence Against 
Women in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, American Journal of Public Health, June 2011, Vol. 101, No. 6, pp. 
1060-1067. 
4 It has been reported, amongst others, from; Europe and Japanese-held territories during World War I and II, 
Bangladesh, Vietnam, Sudan, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Algeria, Liberia, Colombia, 
Guatemala, East-Timor, Rwanda and former Yugoslavia and many more. See Anne Marie L.M. de Brouwer, 
‘Supranational Criminal Prosecution of Sexual Violence: the ICC and the practice of the ICTY and ICTR’. School of Human 
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women and children in vulnerable states that are either balancing on the edge of falling into war 
or have just come out of war tend to experience a high level of sexual violence. For instance, 
according to Amnesty International, in Sierra Leone more women and girls have fallen victim to 
sexual violence after the conflict than during the civil war.5 This thesis focuses on widespread and 
systematic sexual violence in ‘post-conflict’ situations in particular. Influenced by the rise of 
human rights and an increasing attention for women’s rights, the issue of sexual violence appears 
to be included in the transitional justice process. However, when it comes to sexual violence this 
transition is a myth! Even though the armed conflict may be ‘over’, widespread and systematic 
sexual violence continues. What is worse, states fail to respond.  
The Uppsala Conflict Data Program has developed a Conflict Termination dataset, which 
provides a list of variables that indicate the termination of a conflict: victory, peace agreement, 
ceasefire agreement and other outcome.6 This leads me to question the following: if a certain 
group of people within the state is excluded from the termination process and the violence 
against them continues, can we really speak of ‘post-conflict’ violence?  
In order, for an evident situation to be recognized as an armed conflict (and for international 
humanitarian law to apply), in modern law, two variables are used: first, the intensity of the 
violence, and second, the level of organization of the parties. If one of these requirements is not 
fulfilled, the conflict is considered to be but a mere disturbance.7 Internal disturbances are 
situations in which ‘there is no non-international armed conflict as such, but there exists a 
confrontation within the country, which is characterized by a certain seriousness or duration and 
which involves acts of violence. 8  Most likely, massive sexual violence fails to meet the 
requirements of an ‘armed conflict’. However, from my point of view, it is out of place to 
categorize sexual violence as a ‘mere disturbance’ in case of sexual violence, since it is considered 
a grave international crime. Sexual violence in the aftermath of war falls through the cracks; it 
often exceeds the level of ‘low-intensity’ violence but, at the same time, fails to meet the 
requirement for classification as an ‘armed conflict’.  
While perhaps in legal terms, the ‘post-violence phase’ is no longer part of the armed conflict, 
reality proves otherwise. To illustrate, after the formal termination of the conflict, the violence 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Amnesty International documented this phenomenon of post-conflict sexual violence as well in Northern Ireland, 
the former Yugoslavia and the DRC. 
6 See: http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets. Accessed on 10 January, 2011. 
7 Sylvain Vite, ‘Typology of Armed Conflicts in International Humanitarian Law: Legal Concepts and Actual 
Situations’, International Review of the Red Cross, 2009, Vol. 91, No. 873,  p. 76. 
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and fighting continues, we cannot speak of a transition. Accordingly, the distinction between the 
conflict and the post-conflict phase is a mythical one and has been questioned frequently. Brian 
Orend has written quite extensively on jus post bellum and argues that many issues around post war 
justice are too focused on the word ‘post’.9 He writes: “the precise diagnose of ‘post’ is, truly, 
difficult – but by no means should this difficulty be thought to be a good reason to give up 
entirely on the task of providing belligerents with guidance during the termination phase”. 
According to Orend, during the termination phase of a conflict, the war has not ended; 
termination is just a different part of the process. Carsten Stahn supports and amplifies Orend’s 
viewpoint and states that the classical dichotomy of war and peace has lost its significance due to 
change of warfare and the place of war within law.10 Moreover, the amount of sexual violence 
that is committed during armed conflict (and remains unpunished) influences the occurrence of 
this dreadful type of violence in peacetime and vice versa. The subordinate position of women in 
peacetime is tightly connected to the status of women during an armed conflict.11  
In conclusion, irrespective of whether technically speaking it is peace or wartime, women are 
excluded from the transitional justice phase when sexual violence occurs on a large scale.12 The 
rights of women are systematically violated and the state does not undertake any action. 
Therefore, the global community is entitled to interfere, even through a military intervention. 
However, advocating pro humanitarian intervention is a difficult legal, moral and political 
challenge.  
The objective of this dissertation is to examine the possibility of a humanitarian intervention in 
case of widespread and systemic sexual violence outside armed conflict. In other words, if sexual 
violence takes place on a large scale, and the state fails to protect its women and girls, is a 
humanitarian intervention justified? The doctrine of humanitarian intervention was first 
introduced by Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), who stated that a war could be justified when waged to 
assist people who were suffering under great tyranny.13 For the purpose of this dissertation I 
comply with the definition as provided by J.L. Holzgrefe: “humanitarian intervention is the threat 
or use of force across state borders by a state (or a group of states) aimed at preventing or ending 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Brian Orend, ‘Jus Post Bellum: A Just War Theory Perspective’, in Carsten Stahn (ed.), Jus Post Bellum: Towards a 
Law of Transition from Conflict to Peace, T-m-c Asser press, 2008, p. 34.  
10 Carsten Stahn, ‘Jus ad bellum, jus in bello… jus post bellum? – Rethinking the Conception of law of Armed Force’, 
EJIL, 2006, Vol. 17, No. 5, p. 926. 
11 LaShawn R. Jefferson, ‘In War as in Peace: Sexual Violence and Women’s Status’ in Human Rights Watch (HRW), World 
Report 2004. 
12 Nevertheless, throughout this dissertation I will refer to ‘post-conflict’ sexual violence. 
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widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its 
own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied”.14 
The main question that this thesis seeks to address is as follows: “does the global community 
hold a responsibility to stop widespread and systemic sexual violence through the mechanism of 
humanitarian intervention?” I approach the research question from a legal normative perspective 
and analyse deep-rooted legal norms as sovereignty and human rights. However, as international 
law is a highly political field, addressing a political narrative it is crucial to explore the boundaries 
of humanitarian intervention. 
One fundamental obstacle when arguing in favour of humanitarian intervention is the principle 
of non-intervention in international law.  The conflict between sovereignty and human rights 
shall be addressed in the first chapter.  
Chapter two draws upon the fundamental legal norms that are discussed in the first chapter, and 
further elaborates on the validity of humanitarian intervention. The main question that will be 
addressed is what space does international law offer for a humanitarian intervention? The 
argumentation is based on a theory developed by Jean Cohen who argues that sovereignty and 
human rights are both normative principles that have to be respected. The subsequent issue that 
is dealt with concerns the question of whether question post-conflict sexual violence is a crime 
that justifies intervention. Does sexual violence fit in the normative framework as set out by Jean 
Cohen? In order to strengthen my point, I shall further elaborate on exclusion of women and 
relate widespread an systematic sexual violence to the field of international criminal law. The legal 
qualification of a crime in international criminal law is indicative to determine whether a 
humanitarian intervention would be justified.   
The final chapter analyses state responsibility of both the state in which sexual violence is 
committed and the community as a whole. Questions at the core of this chapter include: how 
much protection can be expected from a ‘weakened post conflict state’? Under which 
circumstances can and should the global community respect and invoke the principle of the 
responsibility to protect, and which mechanisms are available and suitable? In other words, do 
human rights hold a legal claim on the global community? Finally, I shall explore the space that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 J.L Holzgrefe, ‘The Humanitarian Intervention Debate’ in J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane (eds.), 
Humanitarian Intervention, Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemma’s. 2003, p. 18. This definition was drafted in cooperation 
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1. Conflicting Concepts: Sovereignty and Human Rights 
The Second World War led to a reflection and reconceptualization of international law as this 
had failed to prevent or stop the systematic killings of millions of Jews and other target groups. 
Gross human rights violations had taken place while the international community stood by. 
Horrendous atrocities were committed and it was agreed that this should never happen again.15 
Consequently, shortly after the war, two important documents entered the international law 
arena: the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter) in 1945 and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948. The fundamental difference between these documents is that 
the Charter applies to states, whereas the Declaration is concerned with the rights of individuals. 
It is precisely because of this difference in focus that these documents, or the implementation 
thereof, can clash.  
Enforcing international human rights law through humanitarian intervention clashes with the 
principle of sovereign equality which, according to the UN Charter, is a fundamental value in 
international law. Accordingly, it is illegal for a state to interfere in the internal affairs of another 
state. Over the course of centuries, sovereignty evolved to become a leading principle in 
international law, codified in article 2(1) of the UN Charter. However, nowadays sovereignty is 
also negatively associated with violence and armed conflict as it seems to give states a licence to 
act freely.  
Ironically enough, applying the sovereignty principle to the Second World War would not have 
made much of a difference. Namely, on the one hand, the principle of sovereignty affirms that 
Nazi-Germany breached international law by invading surrounding countries and enforcing their 
brutal regime upon them. However, on the other hand, the right to sovereignty has a correlative 
duty: non-intervention. It implies the illegality of entering a country which itself has enacted a 
policy that violates human rights. This chapter addresses and reflects upon the antagonism 
between sovereignty and human rights through an in-depth analysis of both concepts.  
1.1 The impact  o f  sovere ignty 
Sovereign equality is one of the founding principles of international law. Emmerich de Vattel 
famously stated that “a dwarf is as much a man as a giant; a small republic is no less a sovereign 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 The Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials were established so perpetrators could be held individually liable and crimes 










	   10	  
state than the most powerful kingdom”.16 In other words, all states are equal and weaker states 
have to be protected against stronger states. Sovereignty was first formally recognized and 
connected to the territorial state with the signing of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. 17 It 
contained two main principles that constitute a normative core in contemporary international 
law: first, the government of each country is unequivocally sovereign within its territorial 
jurisdiction (internal sovereignty), and second, states shall not interfere in each other’s domestic 
affairs (external sovereignty).18 It is independent from other countries and holds legal personality 
in international law.19 Within the state, the sovereign holds the absolute power.  Hence, full 
sovereignty implies both internal and external sovereignty. In order to examine the legality and 
legitimacy of a humanitarian intervention, we need to determine how absolute external 
sovereignty is. If external sovereignty is perceived as an intrinsic right of the state, foreign 
intervention is never a legitimate option. 
Sovereignty is a multidimensional concept, it occurs in several principles, including law and 
politics. Both disciplines will be briefly examined. 21st Century sovereignty is entrenched in 
multiple sources of international law: treaties, general principles of law and international 
customary law. Sovereign equality is a core element in international law. It serves as a foundation 
for other international rules, for example the principle of non-intervention (article 2 (4) UN 
Charter), self-determination and self-defence (art 51 UN Charter). Article 2 (1) of the UN 
Charter, the ‘mother of treaties’, states that ‘the Organization is based on the principle of the 
sovereign equality of all its Members’.20 The Friendly Relations Declaration further explains the 
Charter and lists various aspects of the principle of sovereign equality. It proclaims that “states 
are judicially equal”, that “each state enjoys the rights inherent in full sovereignty”, and that states 
hold “the duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, in 
accordance with the Charter”.21 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Emmerich de Vattel, ‘Law of Nations’, Preliminaries, Section XVIII, 1759. 
17 The peace of Westphalia of 1648 ended the wars of religion between the protestant and catholic states and gave 
rise to a recognize era of nation state dominance. 
18 Seyom Brown, ‘International Relations in a Changing Global System: Toward a Theory of the World Polity’, Westview, 1996, 
p. 74. 
19 Timothy Endicott, ‘The Logic of Freedom and Power’, in Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas (eds.), The 
Philosophy of International Law, Oxford University press, 2010, p. 252. Endicott states that sovereignty and human 
rights are not in conflict. A state can just never be completely independent. A state would be constrained if it cannot 
enter into contracts. Therefore it can never be completely independent. Endicott seems to accept that sovereignty 
can be lost. 
20 By virtue of Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations, an obligation under the Charter is prevalent over an 
obligation arising out of any other international agreement. 
21 Declaration on Principles of International Law Friendly Relations and Co-operation amongst States in Accordance 
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However, the Charter itself provides an exception to the non-intervention principle in art 39 of 
the UN Charter.22 ‘It states that: “the Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat 
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or 
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security”. This article implies that in certain situations the law provides a 
possibility to ‘escape’ the sovereignty principle. Despite the fact that article 39 is ambiguous as it 
neither gives any limitations nor lists specific situations in which the Security Council is entitled 
to undertake action, it does show that sovereignty is not absolute.  
Not only law, but also political science provides an insight in the scope of external sovereignty. 
There a two opposing theories within political theory; realism and liberalism. Traditionally, 
sovereignty has been dominated by the realist paradigm, which argues that states continuously 
strive for power, and that sovereignty regulates that power.23 For the realist, the state has the 
supreme inalienable authority, as it is the only body with control over its own territory. A realist 
would agree that without a strict interpretation of the non-intervention principle, the concept of 
state sovereignty would be an empty shell. This refers to a concentration of power within the 
state regulating the country, and it implies exclusive jurisdiction and the monopoly on the use of 
force within state borders. In the realist view, the existence of a sovereign power guarantees 
peace, stability and security. Political theorists such as Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes stressed 
the urgent need for internal order and envisioned sovereignty as absolute, unconditional and 
extending to all matters within the territory.24 Bodin notoriously stated that sovereignty is the 
“Republic’s absolute and perpetual power”.25 Hence, absolutists envision sovereignty as an all-
embracing right, which cannot be restricted by any other power.  
A contrasting theory is cosmopolitanism, which advocates for a total abandon of the principle of 
sovereignty. Cosmopolitan theorists perceive sovereignty as a power that is unrestrained by law 
and therefore conflicts with international enforcement of human rights.26 For example, Michael 
Ignatieff and Robert Keohane argue that the international protection of human rights overrides 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Scholars have argued that UN Charter itself violates the sovereignty principle by providing exemptions on the 
non-intervention principle in articles 39 and 51. In addition, the decision-making procedures in the Security Council 
appear not be deviated from the equality principle as the weight of votes differs per country. See Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of International Law (online). 
23 Kenneth Waltz, ‘Theory of International Politics, McGraw Hill, 1979.  
24 Thomas Hobbes argues that more than one sovereign in a Commonwealth set up a Supremacy against the 
Sovereignty; Canons against Lawes; and a Ghostly Authority against the Civil’ in ‘Leviathan’, 1651, p. 370. See also: 
Samuel von Pufendorf, ‘On the duty of Man and Citizen’, 1682, p. 146. 
25 Jean Bodin, ‘Six Books on the Republic’, 1576. 
26 Jean Cohen, ‘Sovereignty in the Context of Globalization: A Constitutional Pluralist Perspective’, in Samantha 
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the sovereignty principle.27 I follow Thomas Pogge in my understanding of cosmopolitanism, 
which he describes as a global legal order that references individuals and which is based on the 
principle of equal worth and dignity of all human beings. 28  Realist theorists argue that 
cosmopolitanism inevitably leads to violence and war as outside authorities are thought to be 
dangerous.29 
Less radical than cosmopolitanism but also opposing realism is the liberal idealistic approach, 
which distinguishes between levels of matters that fall either within or outside the scope of 
sovereignty. They argue that internal sovereignty itself limits the absoluteness of sovereignty as 
political legitimacy is given by the people. With the rise of democracy, ‘popular sovereignty’ 
has gained increasing territory in modern politics. It reflects the subjective will of the 
community, which has agreed, to a social contract to create a sovereign power acting in the 
name of society.30 If the legitimacy of external sovereignty is conditioned on the state’s internal 
political order, sovereignty is no longer legitimized by domestic law, but by international 
human rights law.31 Kurt Mills emphasizes the distinction between powers and rights and 
denotes that “human rights are the enemy of power”.32 Taking this as a starting point, absolute 
external sovereignty seems contradictory.  
1.2 The value o f  human r ights  
Human rights are a special kind of rights. They are natural rights, given to all, by the virtue of 
being human. Natural rights even exist without codification in positive law.  John Locke is a clear 
example of a natural law theorist; he argued that, in the ‘state of nature’, men have certain rights 
(‘life, liberty and estate’), which limits the legitimate authority of the state.33 A contemporary 
example is libertarian Robert Nozick who famously stated that “individuals have rights... so 
strong and far-reaching that they raise the question of what, if anything, the state and its officials 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Danilo Zolo gives a brief but clear overview of three possible arguments that are forwarded by theorists in order 
to support the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. See, Danilo Zolo, ‘Humanitarian intervention’, in Samantha 
Besson and John Tasioulas (eds.), The Philosophy of International Law, Oxford University press, 2010. The cosmopolitan 
argument is the most radical one. Also see Michael Ignatieff, ‘Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry’, Princeton 
University Press, 2003. Also see Robert Keohane, ‘Political Authority in Humanitarian Intervention’ in Holzgrefe 
and Koehane (eds.), ‘Humanitarian Intervention, ethical, legal and political dilemmas’, 2003. 
28 ‘Thomas Pogge, ‘Cosmopolitanism’ in Robert E. Goodin, Philip Petit and Thomas Pogge (eds), A Companion to 
Contemporary Political Philosophy, Wiley Blackwell, Second Edition, 2012. 
29 Carl Schmitt is one of the most well-know realists. See for example Danilo Zolo, ‘Invoking Humanity: War, Law and 
Global Order’, Continuum, 1992, pp. 38-42. Zolo’s arguments are based on Carl Schmitt’s ‘anti-humanist’ thinking. 
30 For example, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jaques Rousseau. Even though this political thinking 
originates from the Enlightenment period, it remains the core justification for internal sovereignty. 
31 Anne Peters, ‘Humanity as the A and Ω of Sovereignty’, EJIL, 2009, Vol. 20, No. 3, p. 521. 
32 Kurt Mills, ‘Human Rights in the Emerging Global Order: A New Sovereignty’. MacMillan Press Ltd, 1998, p. 38. 
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may do”.34 In other words, natural rights are considered to be beyond the authority of any 
government or international body to dismiss. 
Human rights ground both legal and moral claims. It is the latter that makes them different from 
any other right. Jack Donnelly states that “human rights do imply a manifesto for political 
change, but this does not make them less truly rights; it simply underscores that they are human 
rights, not legal rights”.35 He means that human rights reflect on the rights one ought to have; 
even an unenforced right is a human right.  
Human rights claim to be universal. However, the ‘universality’ of human rights is problematic in 
the sense that it creates unity amongst human species that are divided and diverse. Anne Orford 
speaks of a ‘fantasy’; human rights generate an imaginary sense of shared identity amongst all the 
right-bearers.36 She refers to Freud’s exploration of an ‘oceanic feeling’, and states that human 
rights initiate feelings of limitlessness and wholeness.37 However, as described earlier, human 
rights have to share the stage with other normative principles such as sovereignty. Moreover, the 
scope and justification of human rights are not universally agreed upon. For the purposes of this 
dissertation it is sufficient to assume the existence of human rights. It is not my intention to 
further elaborate in detail on the philosophical foundations and justifications of human rights. 
The bottom-line is that human rights are often considered the most important of all rights and 
are therefore highly valued. 38  In daily life, people usually speak of human rights when 
emphasizing the gravity of abuse or injustice.  
Nowadays, there is a substantial body of international human rights law. They are integrated into   
international customary law, general principles of law and a range of international human rights 
treaties. The ‘juridical revolution’ of human rights started with the establishment of the United 
Nations and its Charter.39 Art 55 of the Charter imposes a duty on all its member states to 
promote “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for 
all without distinction as to race, sex, gender or religion”. Shortly afterwards, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights came into existence in 1948. Since then, numerous human rights 
treaties have been ratified, both internationally and regionally. Ratification of a treaty diminishes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Robert Nozick, ‘Anarchy, State and Utopia’, Basic Books, 1974, p. ix. 
35 Jack Donnelly, ‘Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice’, Cornell University Press, 1989, p. 15. 
36 Anne Orford, ‘Reading Humanitarian Intervention’. Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 212. 
37 Sigmund Freud, ‘Civilization and its Discontents’ in James Strachey (ed.), The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XXI, 1961, p. 64. 
38 Donnelly, supra n. 36, p. 13.   
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state sovereignty and decreases national power. 40 The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1966 
are core treaties that are widely implemented on a national level. In Europe, America and Africa, 
regional treaties have come to exist. What is interesting about these, is that they are connected to 
enforcement mechanisms where nowadays providing individuals with locus standi. To clarify, 
European citizens have access to the European Court of Human Rights and American citizens 
are able to issue complaints at the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights.41 In Africa, a similar 
tendency is on the rise. In 1986, the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights came into 
effect. The African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Court) was established by the 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, which was adopted by Member 
States of the then Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1998. For our purposes, article 34(6) 
is particularly interesting.42 It holds that individuals are only able to access the Court when their 
state has made a declaration pursuant to article 34(6). However, as one commentator remarks, 
“one need not be extensively versed in African politics to gauge the likelihood of African states 
making an extra effort to provide their citizens and civil society groups with avenues through 
which to hold them accountable”.43  
1.3 The evolut ion o f  human r ights  
Despite the increased attention for human rights and its codification in international law, 
sovereignty continued to prevail over human rights during the decades after 1945. Since 
humanitarian justifications were previously abused for the purposes of warfare, the non-
intervention principle remained the norm. During the Middle Ages, intervention was justified by 
religious reasons. The reason for the Crusades to start a war was to enable people to benefit from 
Christianity, thereby improving their lives. Later, during periods of colonization, conquest was 
justified by the ‘spread of civilization’. 44  More recent, Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 See: Jack Donnelly, ‘Human rights, human crisis and humanitarian intervention’, International Journal, 1993, Vol. 48, 
No. 4, pp. 607-640. 
41 Complainants can only be nationals to a member of the Council of Europe or the Organization of American 
States. 
42 This is also emphasized by Max du Plessis in ‘The African Union’ in John Dugard, International Law: a South African 
Perspective, 2012, p. 561. 
43 J. Harrington, ‘The South African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ in Malcolm Evans and Rachel Murray 
(eds.), The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The System in Practice, 1986-2006, Cambridge University Press, p. 
305. 
44 Tzvetan Todorov, ‘Right to Intervene or Duty to Assist?’ in Nicholas Owen (ed.), Human Rights Human Wrongs. 
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ostensibly humanitarian grounds in 1939, as German troops entered Czech territory to ‘protect 
the oppressed minority’.45  
Later, during the Cold War, despite the existence of the UN Charter and the UDHR, there was 
no space for human rights – they held a subordinate position. The division between east and 
west, and the ideological conflict that went together with that predominated international 
relations. A total outbreak was avoided by holding on to the sovereignty concept and the 
principle of non-intervention.46 Generally, in times of war, human rights do not have priority and 
every party violates human rights. Iganitieff illustrates it aptly by stating that:  
“It is unsurprising that human rights should have occupied a marginalized place in the 
institutional order of the Cold War. No group of nations had any interest in encouraging 
domestic scrutiny for their human rights performance. The Americans had Jim Crow to hide. 
The Russians dirty secret was the Gulag. The ruling elites of newly emerging nations of Africa 
and Asia exploited the new language of non-interference to prevent external security of their 
domestic records”.47 
After the Cold War, international relations changed drastically. The collapse of the Soviet Union 
increased the sense of global unity and democratization. Capitalism strengthened, multinational 
companies became more powerful and world trade increased.48 The effects of globalization on 
human rights are disputed.49 But under influence of globalization, the human rights discourse 
certainly gained more momentum. These developments lead to the rise of human rights 
organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch who in their turn had a 
major impact on the status of human rights.50 
Post-Cold War, a new type of warfare emerged often categorized as ‘new wars’.51 A high number 
of civilian casualties and brutal methods of war such as sexual violence as a ‘weapon of warfare’ 
characterize contemporary warfare. Suddenly, due to global media, the internet and the previous 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Michael Ignatieff, ‘Human Rights, Sovereignty and Intervention’, in Nicholas Owen (eds.), Human Rights Human 
Wrongs, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 52. 
46 Michael Newman, ‘Humanitarian Intervention: Confronting the Contradictions’, Hurst, 2009, p. 38. 
47 Ignatieff, supra n. 45, p. 54.  
48 David L. Cingranelli & David L. Richards, ‘Respect for Human Rights after the End of the Cold War’, Journal of 
Peace, Vol. 36, No. 5, p. 515. 
49 For example, Susan George states that besides an economic definition, we need a political definition as well. 
George sees globalization as a product of neo-liberalism that is only beneficial to a small percentage of the human 
population and defines it as ‘survival of the fittest’: globalization is a process that allows the world market economy 
to take the best and leave the rest. Susan George, ‘’Whose Crisis, Whose Future’, Polity Press, 2010. 
50 Ignatieff, supra n. 45, p. 55. 
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mentioned rise of human rights organizations, human suffering reached into our homes. Despite 
it demonstrates a lack of respect towards human rights, it also created awareness of human rights 
issues. The world realized that these ‘new wars’ require a different interpretation of international 
law and human rights law became more important. Ignatieff states that “the Charter was drafted 
in an interregnum when the Holocaust and the Red Terror existed in a kind of suspended 
animation, not yet the defining crimes they were to become in the 1970’s and 1980’s”.52 In other 
words, when the UN Charter was drafted, they had no idea of the brutalities that were going to 
take place. If they would have known what was still to come, they would have dedicated more 
space to human rights.  
The Helsinki Act, addressing both sovereign equality and human rights, had already been signed 
and ratified in 1970 to improve relations between the Communist bloc and the West. Post-Cold 
War it had begun to mean something. The Act intensified the contradiction between human 
rights and sovereignty as human rights started to play a bigger role. In the early nineties, the 
human rights discourse received significant attention and became a priority on the international 
agenda. To illustrate, between 1990 and 1994, the Security Council passed twice as many 
resolutions as it had done in 45 years of existence.53 Human rights principles were implemented 
in national legislation, the United States promoted human rights abroad and the United Nations 
for the first time actively reacted against human rights violations.54 
1.4 Responsibi l i ty  for  human r ights   
The concept of human rights is tightly bound with human solidarity. As human rights violations 
continue to take place all around the globe, the question rises: “is human solidarity a myth”? 
Political scientists have offered different answers to this question. A rough division can be made 
between theorists of human solidarity that have rejected the impact of state borders to decide 
moral responsibility and those who hold on to a statist paradigm that believes states should not 
act as moral agents. From my point of view, the concept of human rights in itself argues against 
the statist paradigm. The international and universal character of human rights implies an 
international type of responsibility in case a states fails to protect the human rights of its people. 
Hence, the value of human rights can be derived from the level of protection that is offered 
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53 Thomas G. Weiss, ‘The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a Unipolar Era’. 
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which depends on the extent of human solidarity. This raises a question: how can a state sincerely 
value international human rights when it fails to act when witnessing ‘human wrongs’?  
 As Rickard Rorty puts it: “what we mean by ‘human solidarity’ is to say that there is something 
within each of us – our essential humanity – which resonates to the presence of this same thing 
in other human beings”.55 It lays at the core of humanity that what we want for ourselves, we also 
want for others. But, if human suffering takes place on the other side of the world, and the state 
violates human rights itself or fails to prevent human rights violations, should we still care? 
Without taking into account the political motivations of the intervening state, I shall briefly touch 
upon the level of solidarity that, from a moral perspective, may be expected from other states. 
The question here is not ‘do they care?’ but ‘should they care?’ The political aspect of agency 
shall be discussed in chapter three.  
Nicholas Wheeler endeavours to examine the views of anti-statists theorists and distinguishes 
foundationalist from non-foundationalist theories. The latter rejects humanity as an intrinsic 
nature and rather focuses on the ‘we’ feeling that manifests itself within societies and 
communities. Similarly, Richard Rorty sees human solidarity as socially constructed, because it all 
depends on who is included and who is perceived as an outsider. Rorty argues that people tend to 
relate more to people within their social circle as they are one of ‘us’ whereas people further away 
are more likely to be regarded as ‘others’.56 Wheeler correctly points out that the tension in this 
theory concerns the enlargement of the ‘we’ feeling and the possibility of community building 
towards human kind as a whole.57 According to Rorty, there is friction between universalism and 
communities which prevents the existence of a ‘cosmopolitan self’. However, he does 
acknowledge that human solidarity is likely to increase in case of realization that similarities 
between people outweigh the differences. Wheeler sympathizes with Rorty who states that “the 
prospect for the global ‘human rights culture’ depends upon how far ‘we’ come to feel the 
suffering and pain of others by imagining ourselves in the ‘shoes of the despised and oppressed’ 
and coming to realize what it is like to be in her situation – to be far from home among 
strangers”.58 This reasoning seems to point more towards a foundationalist theory which argues 
that there is indeed a shared sense of humanity. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Richard Rorty, ‘Contingency, Irony and Solidarity’, Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 189. 
56 Richard Rorty, ‘Sentimentality and Human Rights’ in Stephen Shute and Susan L. Hurley (eds.), On Human Rights, 
Basic Books, 1993, p. 126.   
57 Nicholas J. Wheeler, ‘Agency, Humanitarianism and Intervention’, International Political Science Review, 1997, Vol. 18, 
p. 17. 










	   18	  
Foundationalists believe in a core sense of humanitarianism that makes us want for others as we 
want for ourselves. Bhikhu Parekh expresses himself clearly when stating that “in being a citizen  
I do not cease to be a human being; to the very contrary my citizenship expresses and articulates 
my humanity. My citizenship can therefore not absolve me from my moral obligations to other 
human beings wherever they may happen to live”.59 Michael Waltzer holds a similar point of view 
and argues that historical and social circumstances do not play a role in humanitarianism. He 
writes: “we are capable of giving expression to a universalist moral code because the struggles 
and suffering of others resonate with our own particular histories, values and experiences”.60 In 
other words, we all hold a core sense of humanity that is unaffected by distance, culture and 
history. Humanitarian intervention then becomes a moral necessity.  
1.5 Conclusion 
Human rights law has become an established field in international law. As human rights have 
gained prominence on the international agenda, international humanitarian law and human rights 
law have become increasingly intertwined. Thus, individual values have to find a place in a 
complex legal field that is dominated by states and regulated by fundamental values such as 
sovereign equality and non-intervention. 
Both human rights and sovereignty have to be taken seriously. Sovereignty prevents the re-
occurrence of colonialism, while a total abandonment of the sovereignty principle leads to 
imperialism. The African Charter is illustrative in this matter as it explicitly emphasizes territorial 
sovereignty due to a history of mass colonization. In that sense, sovereignty is a ‘weapon of the 
weaker states’. However, a strict interpretation of sovereignty does not fit into contemporary 
international law and politics. Sovereign equality stands little chance of affecting behavior if it 
tries to exclude human rights, as they have gained an important status in contemporary 
international law and are legally binding. Moreover, it actually decreases the value of the principle 
as it becomes opportunistic and ambiguous.61 If the context changes, sovereignty has to be 
reconstructed accordingly to avoid becoming a useless norm. Scholars have proposed different 
interpretations of a ‘new sovereignty’, I briefly touched upon a few of them. What is important 
for the purpose of this thesis is that the realist perspective on sovereignty as absolute appears to 
be outdated due to individualization, globalization and cosmopolitanism. Instead, the state should 
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60 Michael Walzer, ‘Thick and Thin: Mora Argument at Home and Abroad’, University of Norte Dame Press, 1994, p. 8. 
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be able to protect human rights and use sovereignty as an instrument to achieve this goal. The 
language of international law is often used in an opportunistic manner that increases the sense of 
antagonism.62 
Ignatieff states: “what do we do? If human rights are universal, violations are our business.”63 He 
also points out that sovereignty and human rights will and should remain antagonists, which is 
the power of the concepts.64 It is finding the balance that leads to complexities. Analysis of both 
concepts has shown that sovereignty allows space for humanitarian intervention. The second 
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2. Validity of Humanitarian Intervention 
The previous chapter illustrated the friction between sovereignty and human rights by providing 
an in depth look into both concepts. This chapter continues to build on the conflict between the 
two normative concepts and seeks to find a legitimate base to justify humanitarian intervention. 
To explore the dichotomy between law and ethics, both seemingly incompatible norms have to 
be further scrutinized with the purpose of providing a theoretical framework to support the 
validity of a humanitarian intervention. For this purpose, I propose Jean Cohen’s theoretical 
proposition in favour of humanitarian intervention. The application of her theory leads to the 
conclusion that humanitarian intervention has a significant place in international law and cannot 
be precluded due to a lack of legality.  
2.1 Lack of  l egal  basis  for  humanitar ian intervent ion 
As mentioned before, the non-intervention principle as described in article 2 (4) of the UN 
Charter is a fundamental principle in international law. However, in two situations the use of 
force is lawful; in case of self-defence (article 51 UN Charter) and when authorized by the 
Security Council (article 39 UN Charter). As only the latter option is relevant in relation to 
humanitarian intervention. The Security Council is only allowed to take measures when the 
international peace and security is threatened.65 However, the legal right to undertake action when 
the international peace and security is threatened does not imply a right to humanitarian 
intervention per se as it is not explicitly mentioned as a specific measure.66 Only in certain 
circumstances can humanitarian intervention as exercised by the United Nations be necessary and 
proportional and therefore justified under international law.67 
However, a ‘constitutional approach’ towards the UN Charter does offer an opportunity to 
support a right to humanitarian intervention.68 In the Admissions case, the ICJ attributed a 
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the agent can exercise his right to X. In ‘On moral arguments against a legal right to unilateral humanitarian 
intervention’, Public Affairs Quarterly, 2006, Vol. 20, No. 2, p. 117. 
67 Unilateral humanitarian intervention (not authorized by the United Nations) on the other hand seems to lack a 
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constitutional character to the UN Charter.69 Judge Alvarez asserted: “the preparatory work on 
the constitution of the United Nations Organization is of but little value. Moreover, the fact 
should be stressed that an institution, once established, acquires a life of its own, independent of 
the elements, which have given birth to it, and it must develop, not in accordance with the views 
of those who created it, but in accordance with the requirements of international life”.70 Surely, 
Alvarez’ point is progressive but he touched upon a very valid point. The UN Charter was 
drafted in 1948. Throughout time, international relations changed. International law should be 
interpreted according to contemporary international politics and it should be able to transcend 
the initial purposes of the drafters of the Charter.71  
In addition, a legal basis for humanitarian intervention can also be sought in customary law. A 
custom requires adherence to a sense of moral obligation and acceptance by a significant number 
of states. Hence, since the mechanism of humanitarian intervention has not been executed with 
frequency, and as states disagree on the status of humanitarian intervention, it is disputed 
whether it qualifies as a custom. Nevertheless, looking at the traditional concept of customary law 
through a modern lens might procure a legal basis for humanitarian intervention after all. 
Frederic Kirgis argues that the exact trade-off between state practice and opinio juris depends on 
the significance of the activity in question and the reasonableness of the rule involved.72 In order 
to balance the absence of a constant uniform use of the rule, a strong sense of opinio juris and 
great moral weight of the matter must be demonstrated. For instance, genocide constitutes a 
heavy moral weight which could compensate for the lack of uniform usage. In that case, 
humanitarian intervention would qualify as a custom. The purpose of Kirgis’ theory is to generate 
a morally ‘right’ outcome. However, a difficult aspect of this approach is that it requires a 
selection of rights that is more important than others. Specifically this has already resulted in 
many debates and will be touched upon later in this chapter. Another complexity inherent to this 
argument concerns the role of morals in legal positivism. Legal positivism is the thesis that the 
existence and content of law depend on social facts and not on its merits.73 In other words, as 
opposed to customary law, legal positivism is morally indifferent. Nevertheless, as article 38 1(b) 
of the Stature of the International Court of Justice (which is part of the UN Charter) defined 
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customary law as a source of law, it is recognized as an independent source of law. It therefore 
does have a place within legal positivism.74 Similarly, Ronald Dworkin argued that despite the lack 
of authorization by a higher rule of recognition, customs still have a legal force.75  
In conclusion, even though the legal source for humanitarian intervention might be blurry, 
finding a legal basis is not impossible. However, having a legal right does not necessarily mean it 
is the right thing to do. The issue of moral legitimacy should also be taken into account. Only in 
case of a ‘humanitarian crisis’ are morals at stake and is a humanitarian intervention considered 
legitimate.  
The fundamental question is whether the political norm of sovereignty must be upheld and 
dominate over moral duty to protect human rights or if perhaps those principles can co-exist or 
even complement each other. Political theorist Jean Cohen argues that human rights and 
sovereignty form a dualistic concept; she configures a very comprehensive and intelligent new 
model of a political conception of human rights.76 Cohen builds upon a more integrated view of 
the normative framework and offers a promising perspective on justification for humanitarian 
intervention.  
Cohen’s theory must be seen against a background of globalization as this has been influential on 
both the perception of sovereignty and human rights. Therefore, before further discussing 
Cohen’s vision I will first address the influence of globalization in the next paragraph.  
2.2 The inf luence o f  g lobal izat ion 
Many contemporary issues transcend borders and are subjected to international law. For 
example, climate change, terrorism and the protection of human rights have a transnational 
character requiring a global response and international policy making. The majority of states has 
committed to numerous human rights treaties. By engaging in international covenants, states 
forfeit exclusive autonomy over these matters and are ordered by the global community to act in 
accordance with international law. Moreover, a significant part of state power is transferred to 
supranational institutions such as the United Nations, the European Union and the G-20. Hence, 
globalization has replaced the coexistence of states, by the interdependency between states. This 
construction of international relations seems to leave less space for autonomous states.  
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Clearly, ‘absolute’ sovereignty is best exercised when decision making takes place on a national 
level, as it provides the sovereign state with the exlusive right to makes decisions. States partly 
lose their monopoly over internal affairs due to an increasingly united world.77 When states 
integrate and share common values, and decisions are taken on a global level, the doctrinal 
foundations of sovereign equality start shaking. Let us not assume that this is necessarily a 
negative development, but solely establish an alteration of the sovereignty concept. In fact, a 
2001 UN Report on challenges of, and perspectives on the globalization of states, it was stated 
that: “in the international arena, closer cooperation and concerted action among states represent 
an exercise of state sovereignty. Such concerted action does not necessarily weaken states; rather, 
it can strengthen them by creating a more stable international environment and by giving them 
greater scope to expand their exchanges in a variety of fields”.78 
As a reaction to this complex ‘globalization-phenomenon’, multiple scholars have argued that the 
principle of sovereignty as defined in the Peace of Westphalia is outdated and that an absolute 
notion of sovereignty is untenable due to transnational issues, (the individualization of) 
international law and cosmopolitanism. Indeed, sovereignty has to find its way in this ‘new world 
order’ in which human rights have become ever more important. Accordingly, a question arises: 
what are the effects of globalization on international law and does this imply that the doctrine of 
sovereign equality has become a meaningless and obsolete notion?79 Below, I will outline a 
number of visions on the impact of globalization on sovereignty and human rights. 
Kurt Mills points at the historical and social-economical contexts that shape the concept of state 
sovereignty.80 Society changes continuously and sovereignty should be perceived as a dynamic 
concept that alters accordingly. Mills refers to three aspects of modernity that influence the 
contemporary perception on sovereignty, of which two are particularly interesting: a focus on 
humanity and an emphasis on the individual.81 Both of them refer to human rights. While he 
acknowledges the relevance of sovereignty, he also suggests that we question the foundation and 
‘update’ the concept to fit into modern times.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Mary Kaldor, ‘Human Security: Reflections on Globalization and Intervention’, Polity Press, 2007. 
78  United Nations World Public Sector Report, ‘Globalization and the State’, 2001, p. 30. Retrieved from 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan012761.pdf on 31January 2012.  
79 Bert van Roermund speaks of two problems of sovereignty: redundance and intercoherence in ‘Sovereignty: 
Unpopular and popular’ in Neil Walker (ed), Sovereignty in transition, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 34. 
80 Mills, supra n. 32, p. 16. 
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In order to understand ‘globalized law’, Cohen places sovereignty within a cosmopolitan context 
and reaches a similar conclusion to Mills.82 According to her, there are two options: either 
abandoning or updating the sovereignty principle. She advocates for the latter. Cohen denotes 
that sovereignty is compatible with moral principles; it protects moral values and therefore has 
moral value itself.83 The mere fact that sovereignty is diminished does not mean that it has to be 
abolished.  
Cohen repeatedly emphasizes that both sovereignty and human rights are central normative 
concepts in a globalized world. She calls this a constitutional pluralist approach, as both norms 
are needed in order to construct a dualistic international system.84 Sovereignty has to be taken 
seriously. To come to a dualist approach we need to alter the concept and create a new 
dimension of sovereignty which complements rather than replaces the existing understanding of 
sovereignty. According to this notion, states can be part of a supranational legal and order while 
remaining their sovereignty. Internal matters are dealt with on a domestic legal, level whereas 
rules imposed by supranational organizations and competences ‘outrule’ the national sovereignty. 
Moreover, Cohen argues for international institutions to be subjected to legal and procedural 
reform.85  
Furthermore, Cohen argues that cosmopolitan law can never replace sovereignty-based public 
international law. As it is neither sufficiently established nor developed. Cohen considers the 
majority of current cosmopolitan, or ‘global law’, as quasi-binding or non-binding rules of ‘soft 
law’. Therefore, erasing the principle of sovereignty would lead to imperial world domination. 
‘Global law’ suffers from ambiguity and leaves space for interpretation, increasing the scope for 
abuse. From Cohen’s point of view, human rights as a constitution behind global politics are 
presently too weak. Cohen suggests that we reform the concept of sovereignty to match it with 
the current state of international law.  
Unlike Mills and Cohen, Anne-Marie Slaughter argues for a totally new understanding of 
sovereignty. This ‘new sovereignty’, accompanying the current globalized world, implies the 
division of sovereignty amongst government institutions and their international counterparts. 
Slaughter argues that this conception of sovereignty encourages states to engage with other states, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Jean Cohen, ‘Whose Sovereignty? Empire Versus International Law’, Ethics and International Affairs, 2004, Vol. 18, 
No 3, pp. 1-24. 
83 Jean Cohen, ‘Sovereignty in the Context of Globalization: A Constitutional Pluralist Perspective’, in Samantha 
Besson and John Tasioulas (eds.), The Philosophy of International Law, Oxford University press, 2010, p. 261. 
84 Ibid p. 270. 










	   25	  
connects them, and creates an incentive to collaborate.86 She describes a ‘new world order’ which 
is based on global government networks, enabling the necessary global governance while at the 
same time preserving the democratic legitimacy of local political communities.  
The overall understanding appears to be that in present times sovereignty can no longer be 
perceived as an absolute concept. This does not mean that it ought to be wiped off the table, 
but it does point to the need of reform. This leads to the following question: does that leave 
space for humanitarian intervention?  
2.3 The tradit ional  approach o f  human r ights  
As stated before, human rights are natural rights, characterized by universality. Regardless what 
race, geographic location or nationality, every human being possesses a set of fundamental 
natural rights that every state has to respect. Cohen labels this as ‘the traditional perception’ of 
human rights.87 When a government oppresses its own people, it infringes on their human rights 
and imposes conditions to which they could not possibly consent. Such a government lacks 
moral legitimacy, and its political sovereignty and right to govern are called into doubt. Of 
course, not all human rights violations justify humanitarian intervention, as it is an extremely 
forceful mechanism. What is more, stretching the legitimacy of the use of force makes the 
principle of humanitarian intervention even more vulnerable. It is therefore essential that clarity 
is generated on which situations justify an intervention, and imperative to avoid both an ‘inflation 
and deflation’ of human rights as they lead to a destruction of the concept. An ‘inflation’ of 
human rights refers to a maximalist account in which case human rights are likely to lose their 
significance. ‘Deflation’ of human rights points at a minimalist account, and implies the risk of 
creating a list of human rights that is too restrictive to be useful. Caution has to be maintained to 
prevent either an overly broad or a too narrow a selection of human rights violations, only 
violations that are globally recognized as inhuman and dreadful create a moral right – or perhaps 
even a duty – to respond.88 In case of crimes against humanity, serious war crimes and (the threat 
of) genocide, universality transcends geography, culture and history. 89  In order to protect 
universal rights, universal action is an appropriate response. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Anne Marie Slaughter, ‘A New World Order’, Princeton University Press, 2004. Slaughter proposes different models 
to govern the ‘new world order’ which all seem to contain some level of idealism: pure sovereignty, democratic 
sovereignty, sovereign state multilateralism, multilateral polled sovereignty, global governance, liberal 
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87 Cohen, supra n. 76, p. 578.  
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However, this approach leads to difficulties when it is applied in contemporary politics. Can we 
expect a state to prioritize an individual need over its own interests? Or, can a state function as a 
moral agent? A major critique against humanitarian intervention is inherent to ‘Realpolitik’; i.e. 
politics and diplomacy that derive from practical and material concerns rather than ideological 
and moral values. Intervening states have frequently been accused of holding double agendas. 
Opponents of humanitarian intervention fear an exploitation of the concept; they suspect states 
to justify their actions with ‘a fake humanitarian label’ while the underlying motive is of a very 
different (selfish) kind.90 Patricia Owens states that the concept of universality is often abused to 
transform a state’s enemy into a universal enemy.91 Intervening states claim moral grounds while 
in fact the underlying motivations favour themselves. Antagonists of humanitarian intervention 
fear that universally oriented justifications for humanitarian intervention are in fact dominated by 
partiality and subjectivity.92 In other words, states are only willing to get involved in another 
state’s domestic affairs, if this allows them to pursue their alterior motives. Hence, there is no 
political will to intervene and invest – and burn their fingers – in the name of humanity.93 I will 
further elaborate on the political borders of humanitarian intervention in the final chapter.  
2.4 The pol i t i ca l  approach o f  human r ights  
Different from the traditional approach, Cohen distinguishes a political approach that connects 
the human rights discourse to sovereignty, recognition and intervention.94 According to this 
stance, human rights function as a justification to infringe the sovereignty principle. Cohen 
argues that “their function in international relations and international law today is, then, to 
override, or set limits to the domestic jurisdiction of states (…) and to suspend the correlative 
non-intervention principle, if and when these rights are violated”.95 From a political perspective, 
human rights are perceived as the ‘gatekeeper’ for membership in the international community.96 
Hence, if you do not respect human rights, you are not part of the club. This view closely relates 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 In the literature, this is referred to as ‘new humanism’. See David Brooks ‘The New Humanism’ in The New York 
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September 2, 2011. 
91 Patricia Owens, ‘Hannah Arendt, Violence, and the Inescapable fact of Humanity’ in Anthony Lang Jr. and John 
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On a different note, the issue of consistency is often used as an argument to proof partiality, selectivity and private 
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to John Rawls’ perspective, who distinguishes moral human rights from international human 
rights. 97 Only violation of the latter rights justify a coercive and intrusive action.98 However, the 
problem Rawls faces in his theory, is that of defining what he calls a ‘proper subset’, which 
implies a distinction between moral and constitutional rights and international human rights.99 
Not every state act that leads to a human rights violation justifies interference by other states. 
Namely, only violations that are categorized as defying international human rights can give rise to 
coercive action by outsiders. Cohen states: “in order to redeem the normative promise of both 
principles an additional element in the conceptualization of sovereignty has to be adequately 
theorized, namely, sovereignty as status and inclusion in global governance institutions”.100  
2.5 A new pol i t i ca l  concept ion 
Cohen proposes a third distinction, also named a ‘a new political conception’. This notion is 
derived from the political conception but values the sovereignty principle through 
conceptualizing the ‘proper subset’. She views the discourse on human rights in a new way, 
namely “as a mechanism to prevent and correct injustices that may follow from the international 
legal ascription and distribution of sovereign equality to states”.101 Human rights have to be seen 
in the light of the contemporary international system; ‘hard’ international human rights have to 
be distinguished from ‘soft’ moral rights. She argues that we set the limits of sovereignty through 
selecting ‘hard’ international human rights based on what is needed for members to be included 
in policy and laws.102 A sovereign state is a coercive public institution; therefore no one may be 
excluded and treated as an outsider. However, in case a target group does not have the ‘right to 
have rights’, the political relationship between the member and the state is abolished. Similarly, 
when someone can no longer be seen as a member of the state, and has practically become an 
‘outsider’, then the membership principle is violated. Additionally, there has to be more than a 
single human rights violation as citizens are only excluded from the state when they are denied 
the right to have rights. In that case the political relationship between the state and the people is 
abolished. In Cohen’s own words: “while moral rights of victims are of course being violated, it is 
the political project behind the violations and the political prerogatives of sovereignty that must 
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be addressed by human rights discourses”.103 Exactly which human rights violations exceed the 
sustained internal affairs of a state are to be found in international law.  
2.6 Exclusion o f  women 
Sexual violence takes place in every society and usually seen as an domestic matter that asks for 
an internal response. Usually, it does not lead to a distorted relation between a large group of 
women and the state. As long as the judicial system in a state functions reasonably well and 
perpetrators are convicted, women are by no means labelled as ‘outsiders’. For example, the rate 
of sexual violence in South Africa is among the highest in the world but there is no call for an 
external intervention.104 Something more is needed for sexual violence to attract international 
attention it has to be ‘widespread and systematic’, as codified in international criminal law.  
First we have to determine what type of sexual violence qualifies as ‘widespread and systematic’. 
In article 7 (g) of the Rome Statute Sexual violence is categorized as a crime against humanity and 
summarized as “rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced 
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity”. Additionally, the acts 
have to be part of a widespread and systematic attack. In the Akayesu case, the ICTR provided 
some clarification on the meaning of those terms.105 The Court declared: “The term ‘widespread’ 
requires large-scale action involving a substantial number of victims, whereas the term 
‘systematic’ requires a high degree of orchestration and methodical planning”.106 As there are no 
exact guidelines determining whether a case of sexual violence meets these requirements, it 
appears that this must be established based on the characteristics of each specific case. 
The second question concerns the issue of whether sexual violence exceeds the level of ‘soft law’ 
and is part of the ‘proper subset’. Cohen states that the answer to this question is to be found in 
international law and refers to the Genocide Convention and the International Criminal Court. 
She states that “if a state engages in mass extermination, ethnic cleansing, massive crimes against 
humanity (…) it forfeits the right to be representing groups it oppresses in these radical ways”.107 
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Let us have a brief look into the status of sexual violence in international criminal law, in order to 
determine whether it can be qualified as ‘hard law’.  
After centuries of impunity, attitudes towards sexual violence, and its status in international 
criminal law have changed drastically with the establishment of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR).108 Both the tribunals qualified mass sexual violence as a crime against humanity, a war 
crime and in specific cases even as genocide. The first case that appeared before the ICTR is 
important for the understanding of the status of sexual violence in international criminal law, as it 
qualified widespread and systematic violence as genocide.109 Kelly Askin summarizes the outcome 
of the case as follows: firstly, the trial chamber recognized sexual violence as an integral part of 
genocide in Rwanda, and found the accused guilty of genocide for crimes that included sexual 
violence, and secondly, the chamber recognized rape and other forms of violence as independent 
crimes constituting crimes against humanity.110  
Besides the Akayesu case, many other judgments have convicted perpetrators for commission or 
omission of sexual violence.111 This perception is adopted in the Rome Statute,  which is largely 
based on the jurisprudence that derived from the ICTY and the ICTR. Sexual violence is 
considered a crime against humanity under Article 5 (g) of Statute of the ICTY, Article 3 (g) of 
the Statute of the ICTR. The Rome Statue, which established the International Criminal Court, 
qualifies widespread and sexual sexual violence both as a crime against humanity, but also as 
torture.112 While both the ICTY and the ICTR adopted similar positions on the meaning of 
torture as constituting a crime against humanity, the Rome Statute is more flexible. For instance, 
the ICC statute does not require that torture be used to either obtain a confession from the 
victim or third party, to punish the person for an act, or to intimidate or coerce the victim or 
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third party based on discrimination. Under the Rome Statute, it is easier to qualify sexual violence 
as torture, since it recognizes that inflicting severe mental or physical pain is, in itself, a crime.113 
The obvious subsequent question is then: does ignorance towards widespread and systematic 
sexual violence lead to a violation of the membership principle? From my point of view, women 
who fall victim to widespread and systematic sexual violence are excluded in the broadest sense 
of the word. Women are expelled from the justice system, denied by their governments and 
excluded from society. Denying their fundamental rights to life, safety and dignity has far-
reaching implications for women’s everyday lives. Besides the physical violence, they are 
confronted with societal exclusion, which effectively literally places them outside their 
communities. Additionally, when the state either participates in crimes against humanity (or 
genocide) or fails to protect the women from widespread and sexual violence, it forfeits the claim 
to represent a group, as the membership principle is violated and a humanitarian intervention is 
justified. States that fail to protect their people from such severe crimes cannot ‘hide’ behind the 
sovereignty principle.   
 
It is not new to use extreme violence against women as a justification for a humanitarian 
intervention. Several scholars have reminded us of the fact that women’s rights have actually 
played a role in previous interventions, however non-authorized. 114  The United States has 
enforced a number of humanitarian interventions in order to protect women.115 An example that 
I would like to elaborate on is the intervention in Afghanistan in 2001. In casu, the lawfulness of 
the use of force was officially based on the claim of self-defence. Actually, the invasion could 
have been labeled as humanitarian intervention, as it was likely to be justified on humanitarian 
grounds.116 Afghanistan was considered an outlaw state where severe human rights abuses and 
crimes against humanity were committed on a daily base, especially against women. Former 
president Bush emphasized the role of women in the decision to start a war against 
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Afghanistan.117 Clearly this was after the ‘victory’ and there were more factors involved but 
violations of woman’s rights were certainly influential. In addition, the Institute for the Study of 
Genocide labelled the poor women’s rights situation as ‘female apartheid’ and repeatedly called 
for a humanitarian action before the United States intervened.118  
2.7 Comparison with universal  jur isdi c t ion 
The purpose of this final paragraph is twofold: it seeks to demonstrate the possibility of a 
legitimate intervention through another body of law besides the UN Charter and it endeavours to 
list specific human rights violations that would justify a humanitarian intervention. My aim in this 
paragraph is not to provide a legal basis for humanitarian intervention, but to explore the 
boundaries of a humanitarian intervention through an examination of international criminal law. 
Eric Heinze argues that the principle of universal jurisdiction can be used as a guidance to 
determine which avenues are available to end certain human rights violations. 119  Surely, 
humanitarian intervention and universal jurisdiction are not interchangeable normative concepts, 
however, comparing and connecting the two is interesting in two respects. Firstly, universal 
jurisduction and humanitarian intervention derive from a similar thought, and secondly, the list 
of international crimes that justifies universal jurisdiction, can serve as a guideline to determine  a 
‘proper subset’ for human rights violations in which a humanitarian intervention is allowed. 
Under universal jurisdiction states can claim criminal jurisdiction over persons whose alleged 
crimes were committed outside the boundaries of the prosecuting state, which affects the internal 
sovereignty of the state.120 The principle of universal jurisdiction manifests itself through both 
conventional and customary law.121 The obligation to ‘prosecute or extradite’ was first recognized 
in the 1949 Geneva Co ventions, and many more conventions followed.122 To illustrate, the 
Convention against Torture contains an explicit duty for states to penalize torture in article 4.123 
The subsequent articles require states to establish jurisdiction and oblige to either prosecute or 
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extradite.124 The customary status of universal jurisdiction is less clear, but it is generally accepted 
that states hold universal jurisdiction in cases of the most severe crimes: genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes.125 In these cases, impunity is considered unacceptable, even though it 
still happens too often. In this vein, Human Rights Watch director Kenneth Roth, starts an 
article that advocates for universal jurisdiction with “behind much of the savagery of modern 
history lies impunity”.126 Universal jurisdiction functions as a safety net to be able to hold 
perpetrators accountable when domestic prosecution fails.  
Traditionally, domestic jurisdiction is tightly connected to the sovereignty principle. It falls within 
the exclusive right of the state to prosecute crimes committed on state territory. The notion of 
universal jurisdiction pushes the limits of traditional sovereignty since it allows other states to 
interfere in internal affairs. However, this does not necessarily have to lead to friction.  
Accordingly, Neil Walker argues: “sovereignty retains a string popuar and intellectual currency in 
constitutional discourse, and it is arguable that the current phase is more appropriately described 
as one of ‘late sovereignty’ rather than ‘post sovereignty’. The crux of this argument is that the 
emerging post-Westphalian order, it becomes possible to conceive of autonomy without 
territorial exclusivity – to imagine ultimate authority, or sovereignty, in non-exclusive terms”.127  
In other words, a state can still hold supremacy even though it does not have exclusive 
jurisdiction. The same argument can be made in case of humanitarian intervention, as the two 
concepts originate from a similar intention. Both ensure that the most severe affronts to human 
welfare and dignity do not go by unaddressed and attempt to prevent and/or end them. The fact 
in itself that certain human rights violations are considered so heinous that sovereignty is 
breached offers legitimate space for humanitarian intervention. Peter Singer states that if 
extraterritorial punishment of certain crimes, which might exceed the borders of sovereignty, can 
be justified, a humanitarian intervention in order to stop those crimes can be justified as well.128 
Aftre all, as stated in the previous chapter, sovereignty is not absolute and exceptions can be 
made. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Broomhall, supra n. 121, p. 404. 
125 Ibid p. 405. 
126 Kenneth Roth, ‘The Case for Universal Jurisdiction’, ‘Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 5, 2001, p. 150. 
127 Neil Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’, European University Institute, Florence, p. 36. Retrieved on 2 
February, 2012 from  
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Secondly, the rules on universal jurisdiction can offer a guideline to determine in which specific 
cases a humanitarian intervention is justified. As Lon Fuller emphasizes, it has to be clear when a 
course of action may be lawfully taken.129 As we have analysed before, the UN Charter remains 
silent on this matter. However, a ‘universal jurisdiction approach’ may offer a starting point.   
Heinze writes: “the legal development of universal jurisdiction depends greatly on the shared 
moral assertion that certain acts should be regarded as serious crimes under international law and 
ought to be governed by legal principles that aspire the end impunity for such crimes. The debate 
on humanitarian intervention depends on a similar moral assertion, except the moral 
underpinnings of humanitarian intervention have not been translated into legal principles”. 
Whereas UN Charter fails to mention specific violations that constitute lawful use of force, the 
universal jurisdiction approach offers a fairly clear list of crimes under which the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction is permitted. Despite universal jurisdiction being derived from customary 
international law, and calls for universal jurisdiction are found in vari us sources of international 
law, there is an understanding of which crimes are subjected to universal jurisdiction. Namely, 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and torture are so heinous and severe that they 
strike at the ‘whole of mankind’.130 Widespread and systematic sexual violence qualifies as all 
three of them. If outside states are allowed to prosecute massive sexual violence when the statute 
where the crimes were committed or allowed fails to do so, foreign states should also be entitled 
to intervene in order to prevent or stop the crimes from occurring.  
2.7 Conclusion 
In the case of gross violations of a select category of human rights, humanitarian intervention has 
a place within international law. The international community cannot be forced to look away while 
the most horrific atrocities are being committed around the globe. And they do not have to. 
Sovereignty is a dualistic concept; the law provides the sovereign with power and authority, and 
restrains it at the exact same time. In other words, sovereignty in itself cannot be the sole source 
of legitimacy as it is not only given, but also bound by law.131  
Sovereignty implies a respect for a certain subset of human rights; a state forfeits the claim to 
represent a group that is excluded from state membership. When state members are denied the 
right to have rights, the political connection between the state and the citizen is lost. Accordingly, 
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the violation of these international ‘hard’ human rights justifies external action. Cohen refers to 
international law to use as a guidance of selection of ‘hard’ human rights. She argues that, based 
on international criminal law, genocide, crimes against humanity and certain war crimes certainly 
qualify as a justification for humanitarian intervention. Massive and widespread sexual violence 
qualifies as all three of them.  
Even though I advocate for humanitarian intervention, I acknowledge the intensity and potential 
risk of such a mechanism. However, the global concern for human rights; i.e. its place on the 
international agenda, and the large number of non-governmental organizations and human rights’ 
movements, imply that there is a genuine concern for human rights. Indeed, humanitarian 
intervention is a final resort. However, certain specific situations require a serious and far-
reaching response in order to achieve alteration. To avoid aggravation of human rights violations 
and actions with wrong intentions, the use of humanitarian intervention must be subjected to a 
restrictive and narrow interpretation.  
International criminal law can serve as guideline to determine when a humanitarian intervention 
is justified. Universal jurisdiction and humanitarian interventions serve a similar purpose, as both 
ensure that the most severe affronts to human welfare and dignity do not go by unaddressed and 
attempt to prevent and/or end them. Even though universal jurisdiction is a controversial 
concept, states have agreed on the legitimacy of universal jurisdiction in a number of crimes: 
genocide, torture and crimes against humanity. It is exactly in these cases that I advocate for a 
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3. State Responsibility 
States hold a responsibility to provide a multiple range of services ranging from good 
governance, rule of law, security, health and education. Hence, when a state systematically fails to 
protect women from sexual violence, it bears responsibility for that. Whether, on a conceptual 
level, massive post-conflict sexual violence justifies a humanitarian intervention was discussed in 
the previous chapter. The answer is ‘yes’. States that fail to protect their women from such 
heinous crimes cannot ‘hide’ behind the sovereignty principle. Sovereignty implies responsibility. 
It does not provide states with a license to act however they want. When a state fails to comply 
with certain basic standards, it is considered ‘failing’ or ‘fragile’.132 This chapter addresses to what 
extent a failed state can be held responsible for its ‘inactions’. The purpose of this chapter is the 
find the ‘tipping point’, in other words: when does an internal affair alter into an external 
concern? In order to find this tipping point, two sub-questions need to be answered: (1) what 
constitutes a violation of an international obligation, and (2) can this be attributed to a ‘fragile’ 
state? 
3.1 Responsibi l i ty  
Before I continue, I need to clarify my definition of ‘responsibility’ as it is an ambiguous term 
that can be interpreted in different ways. James Crawford and Jeremy Watkins distinguish 
responsibility as ‘answerability’ from responsibility as liability.133 The former indicates that a state 
is obliged to respond to any moral or legal wrongdoing. The latter distinction implies a punitive 
response (criminal liability) or an obligation of the state to redress and pay compensation (civil 
liability). This chapter focuses solely on the first dimension of responsibility. It does not address 
what happens after the sexual violence has taken place, but questions whether a state can be held 
responsible for failing to undertake action while sexual crimes are repeatedly committed under its 
jurisdiction.134  
The principle of state responsibility is a principle of general law that only arises when a state 
commits an ‘international wrongful act’ against another state.135 In this case of sexual violence the 
state fails to protect its own citizens. This limits the usefulness of the mechanisms of state 
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responsibility as described in the Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts by the International Law Commission (ILC Draft Articles).136 The problem is that 
state obligations that arise through treaties or customary law only invite other states to undertake 
action when a state fails to comply with international norms. State responsibility is a principle of 
general international law. In fact, traditionally, states are the main subject of international law. 
Even though individuals have gained increasing legal personality, general international law does 
not recognise the right of individuals or groups to enforce rules of international law. However, 
despite the ‘inter-state’ affect of the concept of state responsibility, the ILC Draft articles do offer 
a guideline to determine whether a state has committed an ‘international wrongful act’ against its 
own citizens. The challenging question is: how does this create a responsibility for an outside 
state to act?  
3.2 Violat ion o f  an internat ional obl igat ion  
Article 1 of the ILC Draft Articles defines an internationally wrongful act as a breach of an 
international obligation that consists in “one or more actions or omissions or a combination of 
both”. Two conditions need to be fulfilled for an external state responsibility to arise in case of a 
state’s failure to undertake action in a situation of widespread and systematic sexual violence: the 
act that was committed or failed to act upon has to be a violation of an international obligation, 
and the (in) action has to be attributable to the state.137 The ‘failing’ state might plea that it has 
done everything within its power to prevent and address the sexual violence.  
First we have to determine whether the state, by failing to respond to widespread and systematic 
sexual violence, violates an international obligation. Art 12 of the ILC Draft Articles states that 
“there is a breach of an international obligation by a State when an act of that State is not in 
conformity with what is required of it by that obligation, regardless of its origin or character”. 
Article 13 adds that the state has to be bound by the obligation. A state legally binds itself 
through ratification of a treaty, and is automatically bound by customary law, general principles 
of law or jus cogens (artivle 38 1 (b) of the ICJ Statute). 
Widespread and systematic sexual violence in particular, as well as gender violence, is addressed 
by a variety of international treaties and human rights covenants. For example, article 3 of the 
UDHR protects the rights to life, liberty and security. All three of them are violated in case of 
sexual violence. In addition, article 5 of the UDHR states that “no one shall be subjected to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 Marko Milanovic, ‘State Responsibility for Genocide’, EJIL, 2006, Vol. 17, No. 3, p. 562.  










	   37	  
torture, or cruel inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”. Article 7 of the ICCPR entails 
a similar content.138 Finally, one of the most prominent documents on women’s rights is the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 
which orders in article 7 that “gender-based violence, which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by 
women of human rights and fundamental freedoms under general international law or under 
human rights conventions, is discrimination within the meaning of article 1 of the 
Convention”.139 So, if a state is party to one of the many treaties or conventions that protect 
women’s rights, it violates an international obligation by failing to protect women. However, 
when trying to contruct a legal basis for another state to take over responsibility when a state fails 
to act, human rights covenants are not a sufficient foundation. It fails to address why widespread 
and systematic sexual violence is an international concern and not just an internal affair. 
The solution to this problem is jus cogens, which is a fundamental principle in international law.140 
The doctrine of jus cogens presupposes that no derogation is ever permitted, irrespective of the 
content of their occurrence (peace or war).141 In other words, everyone has to comply with the 
norm. Violation of a jus cogens norm gives rise to an obligation erga omnes, which means that a right 
is owed to all.142 Human rights obligations are generally undertaken as norms of jus cogens. 
Moreover, the inclusion of human rights in the UN Charter implies a binding nature which is 
confirmed by additional human rights treaties and various judgement and opinions of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ). This follows from the Barcelona Traction Case:  
“In particular, an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards 
the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of 
diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former are the concern of all States. In view of the 
importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their 
protection; they are obligations erga omnes. Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary 
international law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 It states that: No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In 
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principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from 
slavery and racial discrimination”.143 
Similarly, in the Tehran Hostages case, the ICJ found that Iran had violated fundamental human 
rights as set out in both the UN Charter and the UDHR, by taking hostage of United States 
diplomatic and consular staff.144 As outlined before, the UDHR sets out fundamental principles 
which are recognized by general principles of law.145 
Protecting human rights is a responsibility of the international community as a whole, it is an 
obligation erga omnes. All states are agents of human rights and can be said to have a legal interest 
in their protection. However, exactly which human rights obligations give rise to an obligation 
erga omnes depends on the level of damage done. Only jus cogens violations give rise to a right to 
intervene. In order to proof that the prohibition on widespread and systematic sexual violence is 
indeed a jus cogens norm, we need to return to the field of international criminal law. As 
established before, widespread and systematic sexual violence can - in certain cases - be labelled 
as genocide, torture or a crime against humanity.146 Since genocide is generally accepted as a jus 
cogens norm, I shall only focus on the latter two and demonstrate that both torture and crimes 
against humanity are part of jus cogens.147  
Jus cogens is covered in a veil of ambiguity as there are no precise rules for what exactly constitutes 
a ‘peremptory norm’. 148  The concept is defined in art 53 of the Vienna Convention: “a 
peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the 
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted 
and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the 
same character”.149 States and scholars have reached consensus on a number of norms that are 
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part of jus cogens. To illustrate, self-determination, piracy, slavery, genocide and apartheid are 
generally accepted as jus cogens norms.150  
According to Bassiouni, enough legal basis exists to reach the conclusion that both torture and 
crimes against humanity are part of jus cogens.151 Not all international crimes are peremptory 
norms, as that would undermine the effect of jus cogens.152 Bassiouni compiled a list of criteria to 
determine a legal basis for an international crime being part of jus cogens.153 (1) opinio juris: states 
have to hold the opinion that the crime is part of international customary law (2) language in 
preambles that confirm the higher status of the crime in international law (3) the number of 
states that have ratified treaties related to the crime and (4) international investigation and 
prosecution of the crime. On a doctrinal basis, it is the threat to peace and security and the shock 
that it causes which label a crime as part of jus cogens. Considering this list, can we now conclude 
that crimes against humanity and torture are jus cogens norms? Yes, it is. I will explain below that 
both crimes against humanity and torture are rules of customary law, and meet the requirements 
as set out by Bassiouni.  
In order for a rule to be custom, it has to meet two requirements; usus and opinio juris.154 This 
means that states both have to agree on the existence of an obligation to act according to a moral 
norm, and demonstrate this through repetitive state practice.  The prohibition of crimes against 
humanity, as well as torture evolved under customary international law.155 To illustrate, crimes 
against humanity were first defined in the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment, and its content has 
subsequently developed through the jurisprudence of the ICTY, ICTR and the ICC.156  
As for torture, article 2 of the UN Convention against Torture requires each State Party to “take 
effective legislative, admi istrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any 
territory under its jurisdiction”.157 Article 2 states that “no exceptional circumstances whatsoever, 
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& Comparative Law Review, 1989, 411.  
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whether a state of war or a threat or war, internal political instability or any other public 
emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture”. The prohibition of torture is absolute, 
non-derogable and holds an international customary status. 158  Moreover, The International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) established in the Furundžija case that 
prohibition against torture is a jus cogens norm.159  
On a doctrinal basis, it has to be determined per case whether specific acts shock humankind and 
pose a threat to peace and security. Without a doubt, both mass-scale sexual violence and failing 
to respond to these types of crimes shock moral conscience. This thesis does not leave space to 
enage in a discussion whether they really shock mankind or ought to cause a shock.160 I assume 
that, if the world would be aware of the gravity and scope of post-conflict sexual violence, the 
conscience of humanity would be shocked.  
Widespread and systematic sexual violence does also constitute a threat to international peace 
and security, the Security Council established this in Resolution 1820.161 Here, sexual violence 
during conflict is explicitly linked with sustainable peace and security. Under 11, SC Resolution 
1820 stresses ‘the important role the Peace-building Commission can play by including in its 
advice and recommendations for post-conflict peace-building strategies, where appropriate, ways 
to address sexual violence committed during and in the aftermath of armed conflict, and in 
ensuring consultation and effective representation of women’s civil society in its country-specific 
configurations, as part of its wider approach to gender issues’. Hence, failing to address sexual 
violence both during and after the conflict threatens peace and security.  
It can be concluded that there is sufficient legal and doctrinal basis to reach the conclusion that 
widespread and systematic sexual violence both as crimes against humanity and torture is part of 
jus cogens. So far, it seems that failing to respond to widespread and systematic sexual violence is 
always a violation of an international obligation. However, there is one aspect left that still needs 
to be addressed. In terms of failure to prevent, is there a difference between commission and 
omission? In other words, does a failure to act also qualify as an act? 
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On an inter-state level, there is no difference between commission or omission of a crime.162 For 
example, in the Corfu Channel case, it was pleaded that the Albanian authorities knew, or must 
have been aware, of the presence of mines in their territorial waters but failed to inform third 
states.163 The Court held that this was a sufficient basis for establishing the responsibility of 
Albania. A similar situation occurred in the Tehran Hostage case where the Court found Iran 
responsible for inaction because it “failed to take appropriate steps” in circumstances where they 
were evidently called for.164 According to Bassiouni, also regarding international crimes, it is 
irrelevant whether a state acts or fails to act. Conduct of international crimes is the result of state 
action or state favouring policy. He states that: “thus, essentially, a jus cogens crime is characterized 
explicitly or implicitly by state policy or conduct irrespective of whether it is manifested by 
commission or omission”.165 This is also enshrined in the Rome Statute, which is signed and 
ratified by a majority of states and creates a responsibility to both prevent and punish.166 The 
preamble reads: “State Parties are determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of 
these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes”. In other words, to respect 
a right by not engaging in a violation is not sufficient. The obligation to ‘ensure’ a right implies 
that a state takes affirmative measures to prevent violations.  This view has been confirmed in the 
Genocide case that holds Serbia and Montenegro responsible for failing to prevent genocide that 
occurred in Srebrenica in 1995.167 The question whether a state can be held responsible for acts 
of private individuals is complicated. In line with general international law, the Court did not 
recognize the notion of state criminal responsibility.168 However, five judges argued in separate 
statements and opinions that the mere acknowledgment that a state can commit a crime implies 
criminal responsibility. This is a highly interesting question that shall be further crystalized in the 
future. For the purpose of this thesis it is sufficient to extract from this case that a state can 
actually be held responsible in case it fails to prevent or punish.  
The subsequent question is then, in which cases there is a connection between the state and the 
conduct constituting a violation of international law. What defines a ‘weakened’ state and how 
much control can be expected from a state that is recovering from an armed conflict? In other 
words, is the wrongful act attributable?  
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3.3 Attr ibutable  to  a weak state? 
Before I turn to the question whether failing to respond to human rights violations can be 
attributed to a failing state, I need to address the issue of a wider ground of justification, as can 
be claimed a the state that allows human rights violations within their territory and jurisdiction. A 
state might argue that widespread and sexual violence in a post-conflict state should be perceived 
as an ‘Act of God’. This is a legal term that refers to acts or events which occur outside of human 
control, for which no one can be held responsible.169 Taking into account my findings in the 
previous chapter, sexual violence is an ‘act of violence’, sometimes even an ‘act of genocide’. 
From my point of view it is highly implausible to argue that no one is to blame for widespread 
and sexual violence. Even though it takes place under specific post-war circumstances, it remains 
a crime committed by humans beings against human beings.  When widespread and systematic 
sexual violence was peceived as an international crime during the conflict, similar sexual violence 
committed in the post-conflict phase cannot suddenly be qualified as an ‘Act of God’.  
Article 8 of the ICL Draft Articles is concerned with whether actions or failures to act can be 
attributed. It is stated that: “the conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an 
act of a State under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the 
instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct”. The 
crucial question here is whether a post-conflict state can be expected to be in control. Does a 
state have the capacity to protect? To what extent can a weakened post-conflict state be held 
responsible for violence that is committed under its authority? For example, South Africa has an 
exceptionally progressive Constitution that, unlike other constitutions, explicitly addresses social 
and economical rights. However, it has been only 18 years since this Constitution has been 
installed and the country is still in a transitional phase, recovering from Apartheid. It is not 
surprising that for example the right to housing cannot immediately be realized for all people 
who are in need of a house. A country takes time to recover from war. During war, a state is not 
able to protect its women from sexual violence. A peace-agreement does change neither human 
behavior, nor state capacities, overnight. Perhaps a state cannot be expected to provide full 
protection shortly after the conflict. This brings us to the following question: what can be 
expected from a post-conflict state? 
In order to say something about the responsibilities of a ‘weakened’ state, we first have to 
determine which ‘label’ suits a post-conflict country best and what the general implications of 
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that classification are. As Donald Potter suggests, it may be helpful to consider state failure as a 
continuum.170 He distinguishes strong and weak states from failed and collapsed states according 
to the effective delivery of crucial political goods.171 Accordingly, a weak or fragile state has lost 
only a part of its monopoly. The term is generally used to refer to countries that suffer from 
weak governance, limited administrative capacity, violence, and often a long legacy of violent 
conflict. A failed state is a state that has lost its power and thereby also the monopoly on 
violence.172 A collapsed state is a more extreme version of a failed state and implies a total 
vacuum of authority.173  
According to Rotberg, the primary political good that determines the strength of a state is  the 
provision of security.174 This refers to the development of a safe environment and legitimate and 
effective security institutions. Clearly, widespread and systematic sexual violence endangers the 
security of women. However, whether a state is to be judged as either weak, failed or collapsed 
acquires a more in-depth analysis. Potter developed a model that utilises four indicators to 
determine the classification of the state: governance, corruption, economic and social well-
being.175  
It would be unfair to see a post-conflict state as a failed state as it needs time to recover and get 
organized again. However, it does seem fair to label it as a weak or fragile state as it is not able to 
take full responsibility yet but is slowly gaining in strength. Rotberg states: “weak states include a 
broad range of states that are inherently weak because of geographical, physical or fundamental 
economic constraints or basically strong, but for the moment weak because of internal 
antagonisms, bad management, and despotism or external conflicts”.176 
‘Regular’ sexual violence in a fragile state is usually perceived as an ‘inside phenomenon’, and 
sexual violence is prohibited by practically every national criminal law system. 177  It is 
understandable that a post-conflict state needs time to recover from war and strengthen its rule 
of law, police forces and legal system. Besides, a weak state is till a sovereign state. As Stephan 
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Krasner remarks: “a state with very limited effective domestic control could still have complete 
international legal sovereignty”. 178  However, when sexual violence exceeds the borders of 
domestic law, affects a large group of people and becomes an international crime, external 
response becomes a valid option.  
3.4 Human Securi ty  
A post-conflict society is in transition and deserves time and space to rebuild and develop the 
state. Human development is a broad multi-faced concept, which includes human security. On 
the one hand, development and security go hand-in-hand. On the other hand, the process of 
development often puts societies in a fragile position, which negatively affects human security.179 
Originally, the concept of human security was connected to sovereignty and territory.180 In times 
of conflict, when state borders and the regime of a state were threatened, security of the people 
was endangered. This perception of human security changed throughout time. Now, due to 
globalization, the human security paradigm has expanded and covers multiple factors of security 
exceeding and actually disconnecting from national security. The contemporary human security 
concept acknowledges that “a ‘secure state’ untroubled by contested territorial boundaries can 
still be inhabited by insecure people”.181  
This ‘new’ human security was defined in a United Nations Human Development Report in 
1994. 182  It entails seven broad categories of security: economic, environmental, personal, 
community, health, political and food. The UN defines human security as follows: “muman 
security means protecting fundamental freedoms - freedoms that are the essence of life. It means 
protecting people from critical (...) threats and situations. It means creating political, social, 
environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building 
blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity”.183 
Indeed, security has many aspects and ‘development’ is a multilateral process that influences all 
these categories. It contributes to state security and individual security. On the other hand, 
however, not all security needs can be met at the same time. Thomas argues that the concept of 
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human security has become too broad and lost its power. In his opinion, “the implied breath of 
this application may have devalued the human security aspect by broadening the idea beyond 
measurable limits”.184 When ‘human development’ tries to capture both individual and state 
security at the very same time, an internal tension is created. Measures or actions might 
contribute to the overall security of a state, but threaten a particular group within the state.  
In order to solve this problem we need to identify a fundamental criterion to define a threat. 
Michael Newman argues that protection is the central notion of humanitarianism and should be a 
key term within the concept of human security.185 Amartya Sen holds a similar point of view, 
according to her human development programmes tend to focus on ‘growth with equity’ whereas 
human security pays attention to ‘downturns with security’.186 Moreover, she argues that “even 
when the much-discussed problems of uneven and unequally shared benefits of growth and 
expansion have been successfully addressed, a sudden downturn can make the lives of the 
vulnerable thoroughly and uncommonly deprived. (...) Insecurity is a different problem than 
unequal expansion”.187 Thomas considers that challenges of ‘extreme vulnerability and imminent 
danger’ are prevalent over other security concerns.188 He lists three factors that indicate the 
gravity of the security threat which concern the ones whose security is threatened: first, victims of 
war and internal conflict; second, persons who barely subsist and are vulnerable to become 
victim of a ’socio-economic disaster’; and third, victims of natural disasters. 
Widespread and systematic sexual violence poses a serious threat against the security of women 
that cannot be justified by the post-conflict status of a state. Massive sexual violence has far-
reaching consequences for a society; besides causing physical harm it diminishes the already 
vulnerable social position of women and breaks down societal structures.189 When a state fails to 
protect its women from widespread and systematic sexual violence, another state has to bear 
responsibility for the protection of vulnerable human beings.  
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3.5 Conclusion 
Sovereignty implies responsibility. A state often plays a crucial and complicit role in permitting 
discrimination and violence targeting women and girls. Even when a state is considered ‘weak’, this 
does not mean that it has lost its sovereignty. Admittedly, ‘normal’ sexual violence is part of 
internal affairs and falls under domestic jurisdiction. However, when a state systematically fails to 
protect its women from mass-scale sexual violence, other states have the right to interfere.  
Large-scale and systematic sexual violence qualify as genocide, crimes against humanity and 
torture, all of which can be classified as peremptory norms when it meets specific requirements 
as set out by Bassiouni. Violation of a jus cogens norm gives rise to an obligation erga omnes, which 
means that a right is owed to all. The erga omnes obligation establishes legal standing of a state, and 
the global community as a whole holds responsibility to protect and safeguard human security. 
Certainly, a weakened state takes time to heal from the wounds of an armed conflict and it might 
not be fair to expect optimal protection of its citizens. However, when severe international 
crimes are committed without adequate response, action by a third party is justified. In the case 
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4. Global Responsibility 
This final chapter addresses the main question of this dissertation: what does the responsibility to 
protect entail, can we even speak of a ‘duty to protect’, and which mechanisms are available and 
proportional for an outside state to interfere? 
4.1 Responsibi l i ty  to protec t  
The 2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 
states that “state sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the 
protection of its people lies with the state itself. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as 
a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is 
unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international 
responsibility to protect”.190  
During the World Summit 2005, world leaders embraced the Responsibility to Protect doctrine 
(R2P) in articles 138 and 139.191 Article 138 states that:  
“Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of 
such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that 
responsibility and will act in accordance with it”.  
In addition, article 137 creates space for an intervention:  
“In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, 
through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-
by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should 
peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”.192 193 
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The Security Council explicitly confirms the R2P doctrine in Resolution 1674 on the protection 
of civilians in armed conflict.194 Namely, it “reaffirms the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 
of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document regarding the responsibility to protect 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”. It goes on 
to express its readiness to “adopt appropriate steps where necessary”.195 However, bear in mind 
that the primary responsibility still rests on the state authorities whose citizens are threatened.  
It is a common misunderstanding to see R2P as an equivalent of a military intervention.196 
Nevertheless, the R2P doctrine covers a larger variety of possible actions according to the 
different phases in conflict; the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react and the 
responsibility to rebuild. Humanitarian intervention is only one of the tools available within the 
‘reaction’ component of the R2P. Other available mechanisms are political and diplomatic 
strategies, economic strategies, legal strategies and military strategies. It may be clear that the 
military strategies are at the final end of the scale as this implies the use of force. When a fragile 
state acknowledges its failure to protect and gives consent to a humanitarian intervention, this 
eases the sovereignty concern and the legitimacy issues around humanitarian intervention. 
However, when the military intervention is non-consensual, it is less clear when the use of force 
is an appropriate response to a humanitarian emergency.  
Scholars have engaged with this question and have developed comparable lists that show large 
similarities with the Just War theory.197 The ICISS report provides six criteria for a military 
intervention, those being right authority, just cause, right intention, last resort, proportionality 
and reasonable prospects of success.198 As I have touched upon most of these criteria, I will here 
concentrate on the one that last one mentioned by the ICISS and has not been addressed yet: 
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consequentialism.199 The consequentialist theory is based on utilitarianism; we are only prepared 
to risk some factors of human security (human lives) if it is likely that by doing so, the overall 
level of human security benefits.200  
The ultimate goal of a just humanitarian intervention is to improve the status of human rights. 
Since humanitarian intervention in itself has caused human suffering as well, it is only permissible 
in case of grave human rights abuses. The consequences of a humanitarian intervention must 
therefore be balanced against the potential harm. Coercive military action can only be justified 
when there is a reasonable chance of success. This is probably the most difficult element to 
predict. Does a humanitarian intervention really contribute to the well being of the people?  
The problem with a humanitarian intervention is always the ‘unknown’ factor. Consequences 
cannot be predicted and pain, loss and suffering are inevitable. However, that should not prevent 
the global community from undertaking any action. Thomas Weiss advocates for the ‘do-
something’ approach and refers to the non-intervention in Rwanda to support his point of 
view.201 Prior to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the international community did not undertake 
any action. A massive genocide occurred.202 Weiss wonders whether it would not be “possible to 
imagine the same outcome but with slightly more robust and more timely international responses 
in that fateful year that might have deterred or slowed the momentum of the genocide, prevented 
the flight of millions, and saved only a few hundred thousand lives?”203  
The ICISS report describes the moral dilemma aptly by stating that “getting a moral motive to 
bite means, however, being able to convey a sense of urgency and reality about the threat to 
human life in a particular situation. Unfortunately, this is always harder to convey at the crucial 
stage of prevention than it is after some actual horror has occurred”.204 
Questioning the consequences of a humanitarian intervention is particularly important in case of 
a ‘fragile state’. Gareth Evans argues as follows:  
“In particular, a military action for limited human protection purposes cannot be justified if in 
the process it triggers a larger conflict. It will be the case that some human beings simply cannot 
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be rescued except at unacceptable costs (…). In such cases, however painful the reality, coercive 
military action is no longer justified. None of this means that the ‘responsibility to protect norm’ 
is irrelevant: just that it has to be implemented here by means falling short of full-scale coercive 
military intervention”.205  
In other words, particular situations ask for different responses. I admit that a humanitarian 
intervention might not always be the most fitting answer to a post-conflict status. As written 
before, multiple mechanisms are available to offer protection to foreign citizens.  
Indeed, in the case of fragile post-conflict states, the ‘costs’ of a humanitarian intervention are 
higher because the state is actually trying to recover from armed conflict and should be given the 
chance to do so. However, we may not underestimate the pain, suffering and loss that 
accompany post-conflict sexual violence. Situations may occur in which the mechanism of a 
humanitarian intervention is less suitable than other, less forceful, available tools. In case the 
consequences of the use of force are disproportionally high, other mechanisms should be 
considered. For example, states can impose financial and diplomatic sanctions or even bring a 
case for the International Court of Justice.206  
4.2 A duty? 
Even though I have not elaborated extensively on the moral obligation to protect ‘aliens’ from 
atrocities, I shall briefly touch upon a moral duty, which possibly derives from that. Does the 
moral obligation to take responsibility in the name of humanity imply that in certain cases the 
global community bears a legal duty? I understand a duty to protect as a duty to aid, which is 
defined by Henry Shue as the provision for ‘security of those unable to provide their own’ when 
the institutions designed to provide such protection are unable or unwilling to do so.207  
The ICISS Report addresses the morality issue in paragraph 8.12, stating that to mobilize support 
for intervention, the “responsibility to protect’ must be substantiated by strong moral 
arguments”.208 In order to find a strong moral argument to support the claim that states have a 
moral duty to intervene in certain cases, one must look within the field of political theory.  
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Shue advocates for the responsibility to protect as a duty. His argument is based on the 
understanding of human rights as more than just a liberty to enjoy these rights.209 In the 
‘Hohfeld-scheme’, human rights are classified as claim-rights.210 A claim-right is a right ‘in the 
strict sense’ that implies an obligation on others to allow or enable someone to claim his or her 
right.  According to Shue, basic rights imply correlative duties to enforce these rights, including 
undertaking a humanitarian intervention. 211  Kok-Chor Tan similarly argues that the debate 
around humanitarian intervention is twofold; establishing the legality and the legitimacy of 
intervention is the first step. The second step is to scrutinize whether the permissibility of a 
humanitarian intervention implies an obligation to act.212 Tan writes: “if rights violations are 
severe enough to override the sovereignty of the offending state, which is a cornerstone ideal in 
international affairs, the severity of the situation should also impose an obligation on other states 
to end the violation. If the right of the offending state to non-intervention may be overruled in the 
name of human rights, so too, it seems to me, may the right of other states to stay disengaged”.213  
Shue and Tan definitely hold a valid point of view. However, there are some complications with 
this approach. First of all, this perspective on humanitarian intervention goes against the 
consequentialist foundation of humanitarian intervention. A duty-based approach is based on a 
deontological normative ethics; humanitarian intervention is considered ‘good’ because it would 
be ‘wrong’ not to intervene.214 It does not consider the possible negative consequences of a 
military intervention. Secondly, it places a risk on the ‘duty-bearer’, which possibly violates the 
rights of the intervening state. Duty-bearers are right-holders themselves and cannot, therefore, 
be obligated to sacrifice their own lives for the sake of others. To place such an obligation on the 
duty-bearer would fail to respect his right to life and, thus, would fail to treat the duty-bearer as a 
valuable human being. In the same line, Pattison argues that in order to speak of a ‘right’, a state 
needs to have sufficient financial resources. If not, it violates the rights of its own people.215 In 
this sense, the universality of human rights conflicts with a corresponding duty to protect human 
rights.  
Taking these complications into consideration seems to imply that only when human rights 
abuses are severe and the outside state has the means to intervene, can they be considered ‘duty-
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holders’. Pattison labels this as the ‘General Duty Approach’, which refers to an imperfect duty.216 
Depending on the qualities of potential interveners they can hold an ‘unassigned’ duty to 
undertake action. Pattison distinguishes two ways in which this theory works in practice; either 
the state that holds the most legitimate claim would be the designated intervener or, the duty to 
intervene could be institutionalized.217 He lists a number of advantages of such an approach, 
amongst which are efficiency, clarity and legitimacy of humanitarian intervention.  
It is not my aim to list actors, or define, which features a legitimate actor should possess. My 
point is that, from a legal perspective, it is problematic to speak of a duty to protect. I follow 
Anne Orford who states that “the obligation of the state to protect those within its territory or 
jurisdiction from genocide and other mass atrocities was already reflected in the Genocide 
Convention, international and regional human rights treaties and the laws of war. Nor does it 
appear that the declaration of an international responsibility to protect has imposed a legal obligation 
upon states to engage in unilateral or collective intervention in situations of humanitarian 
crisis”.218  
States hold a duty to respect, protect and ensure human rights. Whether they hold a global duty 
to interfere when other states fail to do so is a different question. I argue that in this case we can 
speak of a moral duty to undertake action. The power of the duty depends on multiple factors, 
amongst others the position of the potential intervener and the international political position a 
state has taken on certain matters. The global community has expressed a serious concern for 
women’s rights and sexual violence in particular. To illustrate, Security Council Resolution 1325 
directly acknowledged that “civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast 
majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict”.219 It also laid the groundwork for 
increasing its own institutional responsibility to prevent rape and gender-based violence. The 
resolution called “on all parties to armed conflict to take special measures to protect women and 
girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse”. Although 
this was not an outright declaration of it being the responsibility of the UN to stop gender 
violence, between the lines of diplomatically vague language the UN did suggest that gender 
violence had become an issue of serious concern. In this regards, Security Council Resolution 
1820, adopted in June 2008, is also relevant.220 In this Resolution, the UN acknowledged the use 
of sexual violence as a military technique – as a ‘weapon of war’. More importantly, the UN 
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expressed “its readiness, when considering situations on the agenda of the Security Council, to, 
where necessary, adopt appropriate steps to address widespread or systematic sexual violence”. 
Indeed, several high ranked perpetrators have already been punished.221 
4.3 ‘Pol i t i ca l  borders ’  
Up until now, most attention was given to legitimacy of a humanitarian intervention as an act. 
This paragraph concerns the legitimacy of the state actors. My aim is not to identify specific 
actors but to analyse the political agency of states in general. Assuming the existence of a core 
sense of morality in human kind, the question arises: why do we still see so much suffering in the 
world? Or more specific: why is there so much inaction? The main answer to this question is 
politics. States are the agents of human rights, but are they capable of fulfilling this task? In other 
words, can a state ever be a moral agent? 
A fair evaluation of the political view on humanitarian intervention is impossible within the scope 
of this thesis. Therefore I will just briefly mention the main political factors that have the 
potential to undermine a humanitarian intervention.222  
Realists have raised a number of serious arguments against humanitarian intervention to which 
they refer as ‘Realpolitik’. First of all, realists argue that states have more than one political 
objective; respect for human rights often has to bend for other interests. In other words, the 
commitment to human rights is instrumental and pragmatic. As Louis Henkin famously said, 
“almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their 
obligations almost all of the time”.223 The codification and implementation of a significant 
number of human rights impose both a legal and moral obligation on the state. However, in 
reality, when power and moral come together, human rights often get the worst of it. States are 
not moral agents, they are institutions with multiple interests of which human rights are only a 
small part.224  
Realism has been sold to the world as a strong argument against moral state actions and as a way 
to define and abuse power. However, we should not take ‘Realpolitik’ too seriously as a tool of 
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political analysis. In fact, Ferguson argues that “realists will tend to focus on national power and 
prestige, and limit the use of diplomatic, democratic or ideological weapons which challenge the 
realist world order. This is not the only way to conduct the political projection and use of power, 
and is insufficient to even define national goals”.225 
I understand the concern for the abuse of the humanitarian intervention doctrine but that cannot 
be a reason to wipe the whole concept off the table. Rather, generally speaking, is there such a 
thing as a ‘single motivation’ to act? It is conceivable that just like individuals, states and the 
global community often have multiple interests to undertake a certain action. Take for instance 
millions of refugees fleeing from a civil war into neighboring safer but relatively unstable 
countries. A humanitarian intervention may have accumulated motives; just as much as the 
international community wants to put an end to the human rights abuses in the war torn country, 
it also wants to stop the influx of refugees that cause a huge financial burden on the surrounding 
states. In this vein, Michael Walzer argues that interventions will always involve a plurality of 
motives since “states do not send their soldiers into other states, it seems, only in order to save 
lives”.226 Furthermore, according to Walzer an intervention can be labeled ‘humanitarian’ when 
there are some humanitarian benefits even if they are accompanied by less humanitarian 
reasons.227 However, this is only a solid point when assuming that states have an interest in global 
humanity and value human solidarity. Otherwise, humanism is overruled by geopolitical and 
strategic considerations.  
Even though actors might justify humanitarian action based partly on alterior motives, sometimes 
it is the only mechanism to enforce human rights that offers real change. Anne Orford states that 
“many legal scholars seem haunted by the fear that opposing military intervention in Bosnia, 
Haiti, Kosovo or East Timor means opposing the only realistic possibility of international 
engagement to end the human rights suffering witnessed in such conflicts. The need to halt the 
horrors of genocide or to address the effects of civil war and internal armed conflict on civilians 
has been accepted as sufficient justification for intervention, even if other motives may be 
involved”.228 
It is not difficult to see why states are reluctant to forcefully intervene in another country. The 
stakes of a humanitarian intervention are much higher than any other kind of intervention. States 
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are unwilling to put nationals at risk in order to save strangers in distant lands. Besides, the 
financial expenses of a humanitarian intervention are high. From my point of view, the hesitation 
of states to intervene is connected to the lack of legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. In order 
to persuade states to accept the obligation to use of force for human protection, it needs to be 
clear when a humanitarian intervention is justified.  
Realists argue that by denying the right to humanitarian intervention, we avoid abuse by powerful 
states. I oppose this view and hold the opinion that the ambiguity around humanitarian 
intervention encourages abuse. I agree with for example Nicholas Wheeler and Eric Heinze who 
state that even the actions of powerful states will be constrained if the agent is perceived as 
illegitimate.229 Heinze quotes Hans Morgenthau: “Legitimate power, which can evoke a moral or 
legal justification for its exercise, is likely to be more effective than equivalent illegitimate power, 
which cannot be so justified. That is to say, legitimate power has a better chance to influence the 
will of its objects than equivalent illegitimate power”.230 Gareth Evans also addresses the question 
of legitimacy and comes to a similar conclusion. He states that “the effectiveness of the global 
security system, as with any other legal order, depends ultimately not only on the legality of 
decisions but also on the common perception of their legitimacy: their being made on solid 
evidentiary grounds, for the right reasons, morally as well as legally”.231 
The pluralist objection to humanitarian intervention relates to this argument. It states that in the 
absence of an international consensus on the rules governing a practice of unilateral intervention, 
states will act on their own moral principles, thereby weakening an international order built on 
the rules of sovereignty, non-int rvention and non-use of force.232 Realists now conclude that we 
need a legal rule to prohibit humanitarian intervention.233 However, it is also possible to draft a 
law that allows humanitarian intervention under defined circumstances. We need a legal 
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4.4 Conclusion 
The R2P doctrine affirms this worldwide responsibility and states that “where a population is 
suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the 
state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields 
to the international responsibility to protect”. The R2P doctrine does not challenge the status of 
state sovereignty but reinforces it. That is to say, the state remains primarily responsible for the 
safety of its own citizens, and only when the state fails to prevent sexual violence it forfeits its 
legitimacy and responsibility transferred to the larger community.234 
The R2P doctrine offers multiple mechanisms to defend the population of a foreign country 
against human rights abuses, a humanitarian intervention can only be used as a last resort. A 
fundamental and complex question is whether the costs of a military intervention in a post-
conflict state lift up against the benefits. This all depends on specific circumstances concerning 
the general status of human rights and the level of state control. When necessary, a humanitarian 
intervention is a legitimate option. 
A humanitarian intervention is a political affair, which involves state action. The question arises; 
can states act as moral agents? Realists have argued that they cannot as states are selfish, have 
double standards and are unwilling to put nationals at risk. They hold a valid point to a certain 
extend; there are more factors determining state action.  
From my point of view, legalizing a humanitarian intervention contributes to the global human 
rights situation rather than resulting in abuse and selectivity. States are not equal and military 
interventions are reality. However, they are often justified by article 51 of the UN Charter, 
invoking a right to self-defense, while the actual motives are rather humanitarian. To illustrate, 
India entered East Pakistan in 1971 to stop Pakistani atrocities, Vietnam entered Cambodia in 
1978 to end the reign of terror by the Khmer Rouge, and Tanzania entered Uganda in 1979 to 
depose of the Idi Amin dictatorship. Each of these examples was unilateral (non-authorized by 
the United Nations) and seemed to be motivated by genuine humanitarian concerns.235 The 
ambiguity around humanitarian intervention and the individual character of human rights makes 
states ‘feel’ uncomfortable. They are afraid to lose legitimacy if they fail to comply with human 
rights norms and tend to hold on to sovereignty as justification for lack of action. 
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Conclusion 
The contradiction between sovereignty and human rights lies at the core of the debate around 
humanitarian intervention. Both norms have a solid basis in law as well as politics. Contrary to 
what some realist theorists have argued, sovereignty is not an ‘expired’ concept. However, due to 
individualization, globalization and cosmopolitanism, an absolute perception of sovereignty is 
outdated. Contemporary international law allows space for both sovereignty and human rights. 
To illustrate, article 2 (1) of the UN Charter guarantees sovereign equality, while at the same time, 
article 39 of the UN Charter provides an exception to the non-intervention principle and 
demonstrates that sovereignty is not absolute. Accordingly, and perhaps ironically, reality goes 
against the realist perspective as human rights are increasingly used as a justification for 
humanitarian intervention. Nonetheless, despite their universal character, recognition and 
importance, human rights do not wipe the sovereignty principle completely off the table. More 
specifically, only a selection of human rights, a ‘proper subset’, can serve as a justification for a 
humanitarian intervention. 
Exactly which human rights violations justify a breach of the sovereignty principle, is a pressing 
and an apparent complicated question. I propose Jean Cohen’s theory as  a fitting solution to this 
question. Cohen searches for space between a traditional approach and a political approach 
towards human rights, and advocates for a third distinction. She argues that a state forfeits the 
claim to represent a group that is excluded from state membership. If state members are denied 
the right to have rights, and ‘hard law’ is violated, the political connection between the state and 
the people is lost. Consequently, when mass-scale sexual violence occurs in a state that 
systematically fails to protect its women, the victims of sexual violence can be labeled as 
‘outsiders’ and the membership-principle is violated. Additionally, as Cohen suggests, the status 
of sexual violence in international criminal law provides us with a guideline to determine in which 
specific cases a humanitarian intervention is justified.  
This guideline is twofold: firstly, the qualification in international criminal law is indicative for 
selecting human rights violations that justify humanitarian intervention. Widespread and 
systematic sexual  violence is part of ‘hard law’ as it qualifies as the most severe international 
crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity and torture. Secondly, the concepts of universal 
jurisdiction and humanitarian interventions follow from a similar thought; both ensure that the 
most severe affronts to human welfare and dignity do not go by unaddressed and attempt to 
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its people from violence and/or when a state fails to prosecute perpetrators, others states can 
intervene or exercise universal jurisdiction.  
Obviously, the nation state holds the the main responsibility for the well being of its people. 
Admittedly, violence and crime seems inherent to humanity, and practically every society is 
confronted with sexual violence. The bulk of the sexual crimes that are committed remain an 
internal affair and are subject to domestic jurisdiction. However, in case sexual violence is 
‘widespread and systematic’, and the state fails to respond, it becomes an external affair. Since 
widespread and systematic violence holds a status in international criminal law, failing to comply 
with these norms leads to a breach of an international obligation. 
I follow Bassiouni’s argument who states that certain international crimes qualify as a jus cogens 
norm, which means that everyone has to comply with the norm. Violation of such a peremptory 
norm gives rise to an obligation erga omnes. Genocide, crimes against humanity and torture all 
qualify as a jus cogens norm, which accordingly creates an obligation for all states to undertake 
action. Hence, a state is mainly responsible for its own citizens, but if it fails to protect its 
citizend and prevent sexual violence from occuring, an outside state is entitled to intervene. 
When taking global responsibility, humanitarian intervention is a legal and legitmate option.  
The ‘post-conflict’ character of the violence and the lower level of protection that can be 
expected from a weak or fragile state is understandable but does not weigh up against the damage 
done. Sexual violence is an extremely serious crime that asks for a serious response.  
In conclusion, only in a number of select cases justifies a humanitarian intervention. Widespread 
and systematic sexual violence is one of those cases. Even though it appears to be an ‘inside 
phenomenon’, it is of global concern. It shocks mankind, forms a threat against peace and 
security and classifies as the most dreadful international crimes.  
I advocate for clearer rules on humanitarian intervention that allow the use of force in certain 
cases that serve a humanitarian purpose. Humanitarian interventions are reality, they are not just 
an ambiguous concept. I acknowledge the fragility of post-conflict societies and the far-reaching 
consequences of a military intervention. However, in order to make a statement, one sometimes 
has to exaggerate. Besides, the R2P doctrine provides the global community with a number of 
mechanisms besides a humanitarian intervention that do not imply the use of force. Perhaps a 
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The aim of this thesis is not to advocate for a humanitarian intervention per se when widespread 
and sexual violence occurs in a state that fails to respond to it. In order to do so, case studies 
need to be done that scrutinize and analyze the roots, causes and nature of the sexual violence. 
My goal here is to emphasize that sexual violence against women in a post-conflict phase exceeds 
the limits of ‘low-intensity’ violence and has to be taken seriously. The global community has 
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